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Borrowers Beware: The OCC’s “Madden-fix” Rules
and Their Shield for Predatory Lenders
I. INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that the lending market values clarity and stability.1
As a result, banks and nonbank lenders seek certainty in the application
of laws and regulations.2 In 2017, the lending market faced a disruption
in the form of Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC.3 Madden brought to
the forefront a debate over two facets of the lending world, both of which
had been fermenting for some time.4 Specifically, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) saw Madden’s holding as an attack
on two long-held assumptions—the Valid When Made5 and True Lender
doctrines.6 Through two separate rules, the OCC has attempted to restore
1. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscalservice/fsoc [https://perma.cc/EZS3-JV7E] (showcasing the role of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council as one of the many facets of lending market stability and riskidentification).
2. See, e.g., Marquette Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha Svc. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 312 (1978)
(noting that without clarity, banks could never be certain as to the permissibility of their
actions); see generally Philipp Härle et al., The Future of Bank Risk Management, MCKINSEY
& CO. (July 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-insights/thefuture-of-bank-risk-management [https://perma.cc/2AY7-2K5R] (analyzing the trends in risk
management and new potential risks for banks and lenders in the wake of the global financial
crisis).
3. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 237 F. Supp. 3d 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (deciding on
remand from the 2d Cir. Court of Appeals in Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d
246 (2d Cir. 2015)).
4. See id. For a discussion of the doctrines prior to Madden, see infra-Part II.
5. The premise of the Valid When Made doctrine is that once an acceptable interest rate is
created on a loan, then it stays valid and applicable even through subsequent transfers or
purchases. This doctrine has long been understood to apply to federal and state-chartered
banks via interest rate choices of law granted under 12 U.S.C. §§ 85 and 1831d, but the central
debate is whether these interest rates remain valid when in the hands of a non-bank entity who
alone could not enjoy the choice of law of either statute. Drew Robertson, Five Years Later:
Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC’s Limited Impact on the Valid When Made Doctrine, KANE
RUSSELL COLEMAN LOGAN (Feb. 27, 2020) https://lawofbanking.com/2020/02/27/five-yearslater-madden-v-midland-funding-llcs-limited-impact-on-the-valid-when-made-doctrine/
[https://perma.cc/L9C9-65H6] (providing a brief history of the doctrine and viewing it
alongside the market effects of Madden).
6. The True Lender doctrine is a creation that works in tandem with the Valid When Made
doctrine, allowing courts to examine the nature of lending relationships, revealing potential
predatory lending practices. This doctrine focuses on relationships where a chartered bank
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clarity to the lending market by providing its stance on the two
contentious issues (the “Madden-fix rules”). 7 Instead, the only thing that
is clear about the OCC’s rules is that, in their current form, consumers
are left powerless and without redress for the harms caused by predatory
lending practices. 8 The OCC should revisit and revise these rules to
prevent a resurgence in predatory lending.9
Madden’s core decision rested on the Second Circuit’s belief that
a non-bank entity could not enjoy the interest rate choice of law granted
to national or state chartered banks under 12 U.S.C. § 85, the National

offloads a loan to a non-bank entity, a common permissible practice but one that predatory
lenders have traditionally sought to exploit. The OCC and FDIC Plan to Trample State Laws
by Gutting the Longstanding “True Lender” Doctrine, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Aug.
10,
2020),
https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/researchpublication/crl-gutting-true-lender-rule-10aug2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QTS7-QHXS]
(giving a strong overview of the role of the True Lender doctrine in rooting out predatory
lenders).
7. See Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred,
85 Fed. Reg.
33,530 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (providing the OCC’s
final Valid When Made Rule); see also National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as
Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (offering the
OCC’s final True Lender rule).
8. Prof. Adam J. Levitin has been a vocal critic of the OCC’s Madden-fix approaches. He
offers a very convincing set of arguments both about the history of the doctrines and how he
believes that the OCC and Congress fell short in their responses by opening a gap for
predatory lenders to exploit. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, ‘Madden Fix’ Bills Are a Recipe for
Predatory
Lending,
AM .
BANKER
(Aug.
28,
2017),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/madden-fix-bills-are-a-recipe-for-predatorylending [https://perma.cc/KVL5-LGEQ] [hereinafter Levitin: ‘Madden-fix’ bills] (arguing
that the attempted codification of the Valid When Made doctrine, discussed at infra Part III.A,
would increase the risk of predatory lending to at-risk consumers); see also See Adam J.
Levitin, Guess Who’s Supporting Predatory Lending, CREDIT SLIPS (Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/08/guess-whos-supporting-predatorylending.html#more [https://perma.cc/V8SV-EQPF] [hereinafter Levitin: Predatory Lending]
(blaming the Democrat sponsors of the Madden-fix bills for “supporting predatory lending”
by not accurately accounting for the role of the Valid When Made doctrine); see also Adam
J. Levitin, Trump Administration Declares Open Season on Consumers for Subprime Lenders,
CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/11/trumpadministration-declares-open-season-on-consumers.html
[https://perma.cc/7M3A-PBHF]
[hereinafter Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders] (criticizing the Trump
administration and the OCC’s Madden-fix rules for the potential harm that they could cause
to subprime lenders).
9. See infra Part V.
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Bank Act (“NBA”),10 and its sister statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1831d.11 For over
forty years these two laws have allowed federal and state banks to issue
loans based on the interest rates of the state where they are
headquartered.12 The Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines have
evolved under these statutes.13 The former assumes that an interest rate
created by a bank under either statute will “stick with” the loan through
any subsequent transfers or sales to a non-bank lender (“marketplace
lenders”).14 Therefore, as per its namesake, the Valid When Made
doctrine would render the rate “valid” when it was made. 15 The True
Lender doctrine worked as a tool to root out predatory marketplace
lenders who used the Valid When Made doctrine to circumvent state
usury laws.16

10. The OCC’s Valid When Made and True Lender rules both cite the NBA as its authority
for promulgation. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1980). While the Madden Court discussed the application
of the National Bank Act as a “preemption” of state usury laws, this Note argues that this
label is a misnomer. Instead of working to preempt an inconsistent state law, the NBA
chooses one state’s usury law (the state of the bank’s headquarters) and declares it superior to
that of a competing state. See Marquette Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha Svc. Corp., 439 U.S.
299, 313 (1978) (showcasing the leading Supreme Court case where the NBA is applied, and
a bank’s “location” is the state of its headquarters).
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (1989) (providing the same state usury law selection for statechartered banks as the NBA provides for federally-chartered banks).
12. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1980); 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (1989). Both statutes were last amended in
the 1980s and have been applied through a robust body of case law. See generally Marquette
Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha Svc. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978) (allowing banks to choose the
usury law of the state of their headquarters).
13. See William Atherton, Lisa Ledbeddter & Heith Rodman, Bank Regulators Clarify the
“Valid
When
Made”Doctrine,
JD
SUPRA
(Nov.
25,
2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/bank-regulators-clarify-the-valid-when-45960/
[https://perma.cc/ZDW6-N75L] (“The ‘valid-when-made’ doctrine is a long-standing
common law doctrine providing that bank loans carrying interest rates that are valid when
made under applicable federal law remain valid with respect to that rate, regardless of whether
a bank has subsequently sold or assigned the loan to a third party.”)
14. See Robertson, supra note 5 (“The ‘valid-when-made-doctrine’ is an important
component of usury law. It provides that a loan that has a non-usurious interest rate when it
is made cannot become usurious if the loan is subsequently transferred to a third party, even
if the third party is in a different state with different lending laws.”).
15. See id. (“For example, if a lender charges interest in Wisconsin that is not usurious
under Wisconsin law, a third party in Texas can buy that loan without having to conform the
interest rate to Texas’s more conservative interest cap.”).
16. See Zane Gilmer, True Lender Litigation on the Rise: Recent Litigation and
Enforcement Actions Challenge Traditional Bank Partnership Model, STINSON (Apr. 2,
2018), http://dodd-frank.com/2018/04/02/true-lender-litigation-on-the-rise-recent-litigationand-enforcement-actions-challenge-traditional-bank-partnership-model/
[https://perma.cc/2LGP-YWE6] (tracing some of the most well-known True Lender
enforcement actions and noting their variation(s) by state).
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On its face, the Madden-fix rulemaking seemed to provide some
much needed clarity.17 Admittedly, many marketplace lenders—such as
financial technology (“fintech”) firms—were left in limbo after
Madden.18 The OCC sought to provide certainty to these entities,
allowing them to continue their business practices without the worries of
conflicting stances on these foundational doctrines.19 However, when
one looks beyond these surface-level benefits, problems arise.20
The reality is that the OCC’s Madden-fix is anything but clear.21
In one fell swoop, the OCC has offered certainty to legitimate businesses
while inviting predatory lenders to find new footholds in avoiding state
usury laws.22 Now, inquiries into suspect lending relationships are told
17. See Brandon Curtin et al., OCC Issues Final Rule Clarifying the “Valid When Made”
Doctrine, JD SUPRA (June 5, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/occ-issues-finalrule-clarifying-the-77170/ [https://perma.cc/Q85U-VU44] (“The [Valid When Made] Rule
fills the gap by providing that the interest rate is unaffected by the assignment of a loan
contract.”); see also Angela Rankins, OCC Issues Final “True Lender” Rule, JD SUPRA,
(Nov. 4, 2020) https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/occ-issues-final-true-lender-rule-68235/
[https://perma.cc/7N94-TWPM] (“Further, Acting Comptroller Brian Brooks recently said in
a statement that the Final [True Lender] Rule ‘clarifies that banks retain compliance
obligations for loans they originate.’”).
18. See Benjamin Lo, Online Lenders Shouldn't Get Mad Over Madden, 10 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 63, 71–74 (2016) (critiquing Madden and suggesting changes that
financial technology companies should make to limit their exposure but also cautioning
against hasty overhauls of business models).
19. See Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred,
85 Fed. Reg. 33,532 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (“[T]o
effectively assign a loan contract and allow the assignee to step into the shoes of the national
bank assignor, a permissible interest term must remain permissible and enforceable
notwithstanding the assignment.”).
20. Commentators who oppose the Madden-fix have offered a whole myriad of issues and
problems which they perceive to be plaguing the rules. Ranging from potential violations of
the Dodd-Frank Act and the Administrative Procedure Act, to more practical concerns on
future lending, the comment letter from the Center for Responsible Lending, et al., provides
a comprehensive summary of all these arguments. See Center For Responsible Lending,
Comment Letter to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, at 38 (Sept. 3, 2020)
https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/OCC-True-LenderComment_Sept3_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY8U-PXSV] [hereinafter CRL Comment
Letter] (arguing that the practical impacts of these rules will severely damage lending to small
businesses and consumers).
21. See Matthew J. Razzano, A Better Madden Fix: Holistic Reform Not Band-Aids, to
Modernize Banking Law, 54 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM CAVEAT BLOG POST (July 3, 2020)
https://mjlr.org/2020/07/03/a-better-madden-fix-holistic-reform-not-band-aids-tomodernize-banking-law// [https://perma.cc/EH24-8KHM] (arguing that the OCC’s current
approach to fixing Madden simply acts as a patch and ignores the “deeper systemic issues at
the heart of Madden”).
22. See Levitin: Predatory Lending, supra note 8 (“Usury laws represent judgments by
state legislatures about rates at which borrowing is presumptively too risky. If Congress wants
to preempt those usury laws, that’s one thing, but it’s outrageous to allow national banks to
launder usurious loans for predatory lenders.”).
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to cease upon discovery of a loan’s originating entity, granting predatory
lenders carte blanche to operate in the shadows of a bank’s charter. 23 The
combination of these rules has the potential to do more harm to the
lending market than Madden ever could have. 24 Therefore, the OCC
should revise its Madden-fix rules to preclude certain lending
relationships by forcing banks to take the initial risk of their loans while
allowing states to retain more flexibility in enforcing consumer protection
and usury laws.25 Without such a change, states and consumers will be
left powerless and unprotected from predatory lenders. 26
This note proceeds in six parts. Part II briefly analyzes the facts
of Madden and discusses where the Second Circuit went wrong in its
interpretation of the NBA. Part III reviews the lending world and the
Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines pre-Madden, highlighting
just how significant the OCC’s Madden-fix rules truly are. Part IV looks
at the rules themselves, bifurcating the positive impacts which should be
preserved from the negatives which must be addressed. Part V offers
several potential solutions for the OCC to consider in revisiting its
Madden-fix rules.

23. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC Should Withdraw its Proposed “True Lender”
Rule,
THE
FIN
R EG
BLOG
(Aug.
31,
2020)
https://sites.law.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2020/08/31/the-occ-should-withdraw-its-proposedtrue-lender-rule/#_ftn1 [https://perma.cc/2RTS-RDQK] (“The proposed rule would allow a
national bank or federal thrift to act as a mere conduit by quickly transferring loans to its
nonbank ‘partner,’ which could assume all of the economic risks and control the terms and
enforcement of the loans.”).
24. Much of this Note is premised on the argument that Madden’s market impact was quite
negligible in terms of affecting the Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines. However,
the OCC’s Madden-fix rules have the potential for a much more worrisome impact on the
market and on consumer protection. See Charles M. Horn & Melissa R. H. Hall, The Curious
Case of Madden v. Midland Funding and the Survival of the Valid-When-Made Doctrine, 21
N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 22 (2017); see also Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23 (observing that after
the “anxiety and disruption” of Madden’s ruling passed, the marketplace was able to adjust to
the holding).
25. See infra Part V.
26. See Press Release, NCLC, OCC Proposal Would Turn State Interest Rate Limits Into
a “Dead Letter,” Causing Explosion of Rent-a-Bank Payday Lending That Will Devastate
Struggling Families (July 20, 2020), https://www.nclc.org/media-center/occ-proposal-wouldturn-state-interest-rate-limits-into-a-dead-letter-causing-explosion-of-rent-a-bank-paydaylending-that-will-devastate-struggling-families.html
[https://perma.cc/9CXD-EL8M]
[hereinafter NCLC Press Release] (claiming that the OCC’s Madden-fix rules will render
states without power to protect at-risk consumers, especially in the context of the COVID-19
pandemic).
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II. MADDEN AND ITS EFFECTS
The premise of Madden was relatively simple. Saliha Madden
owed $5,000 on her credit card bill to Bank of America (“BoA”), a
nationally chartered bank.27 The debt between Ms. Madden and BoA was
set at an interest rate of 27%, a rate higher than the allowable 25% in Ms.
Madden’s home state of New York.28 As per the interest rate choice of
law granted to BoA under the NBA,29 BoA could charge Ms. Madden the
interest rate of the state where the bank is headquartered.30
Subsequently, BoA transferred Ms. Madden’s debt to its newly
consolidated credit card service, FIA Card Services, N.A. (“FIA”). 31
After determining that Ms. Madden’s debt was “uncollectable,” FIA sold
her debt to a purchaser, Midland Funding, LLC (“Midland”). 32 At this
point, as the court in Madden emphasized, neither BoA nor FIA held any
interest in Ms. Madden’s debt.33 Ms. Madden then challenged Midland’s
27. See generally Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 237 F. Supp. 3d 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(deciding, on remand from the Second Circuit, that New York usury laws prevented Midland
Funding from collecting Madden’s debt at its 27% rate).
28. See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“Accordingly, because FIA is incorporated in Delaware, which permits banks to charge
interest rates that would be usurious under New York law, FIA's collection at those rates in
New York does not violate the NBA and is not subject to New York's stricter usury laws,
which the NBA preempts.”).
29.
See
Bank
of
Am.,
Bank
of
America
FAQ’s,
https://www.bankofamerica.com/help/facts/ [https://perma.cc/LRC5-4PKD] (last visited
Dec. 9, 2020) (stating that BoA’s corporate address is 100 North Tryon Street, Charlotte, NC
28255).
30. See BANK OF AM. CO., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2015) (showing BoA’s
headquarters as North Carolina and its place of incorporation as Delaware).
31. To understand this transaction, it must be clear which entities came to have ownership
over Ms. Madden’s debt and how. In 2006 Bank of America acquired a large cardholder
association, the Maryland Bank National Association (“MBNA”). Within the same year,
MBNA was acquired by another banking group known as Lloyd’s Banking Group. However,
while it was held by Bank of America, MBNA was consolidated into FIA, the entity which
eventually sold Ms. Madden’s debt to Midland Funding, LLC. See Madden v. Midland
Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 2015) (giving the procedural background and
history of Ms. Madden’s debt and its passing through various entities, ending with Midland
Funding, LLC); see also Christina Majaski, What is FIA Credit Card Services, CARDS MIX,
(Feb. 17, 2017) https://cardsmix-usa-avqfktzllevohwsax.netdna-ssl.com/fia-credit-cardservices [https://perma.cc/ZG7L-XM83] (tracing the history and transformation of FIA Card
Services).
32. See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Madden
owed approximately $5,000 on her credit card account and in 2008, FIA ‘charged-off’ her
account . . . . FIA then sold Madden's debt to Defendant–Appellee Midland Funding, LLC [ ]
a debt purchaser.”).
33. See id. (“Upon Midland Funding’s acquisition of Madden’s debt, neither FIA nor BoA
possessed any further interest in the account.”).
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ability to charge her the 27% interest rate set by BoA. 34 Midland was
neither a national nor a state-chartered bank, and such a rate—absent an
applicable choice of usury law provision—was clearly more than the
maximum interest allowed under New York usury laws. 35
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Ms. Madden. 36
In reversing the district court’s holding, the Second Circuit pointed to the
fact that “neither defendant is a national bank nor a subsidiary of a
national bank,” as its reasoning for withholding NBA interest-rate choice
of law from Midland.37 In sum, the Second Circuit looked solely at the
NBA and the fact that Midland was not a nationally chartered bank. 38
From there, it concluded that the NBA’s choice of state usury laws was
not applicable to such a secondary loan purchaser. 39 Once the loan left
the hands of a chartered bank, the Second Circuit believed that the loan
lost the ability to charge the customer based on a different state’s interest
rate.40
A.

Where the Madden-Court Went Wrong

The first major problem with Madden’s holding was that the
Second Circuit seemed to ignore the existence of the Valid When Made
and True Lender doctrines.41 In fact, the case makes no mention of either
doctrine.42 Because of the ruling’s implicit potential effect on the
34. See id. (offering the background on Ms. Madden’s subsequent class action against
Midland, along with her central claims).
35. See id. at 249 (“Because neither defendant is a national bank nor a subsidiary or agent
of a national bank or is otherwise acting on behalf of a national bank, . . . . we reverse the
District Court's holding that the NBA preempts Madden's claims and accordingly vacate the
judgment of the District Court.”).
36. Id.
37. See id. at 247–49 (providing the Second Circuit’s guiding reason as to why it declined
to apply the NBA to the debt held by Midland).
38. See id. at 248 (defining a nationally chartered bank).
39. See id. at 249–50 (showcasing the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the NBA as
applying to banks and certain agents/extensions of banks but declining to extend its coverage
to an entity such as Midland Funding).
40. See id. at 250 (“The defendants argue that, as assignees of a national bank, they too are
allowed under the NBA to charge interest at the rate permitted by the state where the assignor
national bank is located . . . . [w]e disagree.”).
41. See id. at 249–50 (offering an entire section of the Madden opinion, dedicated to
discussing the NBA as “preemption”); see also Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 27–28
(“Because the valid-when-made doctrine was not an issue that had been brought before the
District Court, its decision made no mention of the doctrine, nor did the decision address any
substantive issues regarding the nature and extent of national bank preemption in the loan
transfer context.”).
42. See generally Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015).
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viability and application of the doctrines, many observers read inbetween the lines of the holding.43 Some commentators, including the
OCC, saw this holding as a challenge to the very existence of both
doctrines.44 The OCC acknowledged the disruption caused by Madden,
nodding to it as the necessary cause for promulgating its final Valid When
Made rule. 45 The OCC then cited the “ambiguity” and silence of the NBA
as its basis for issuing the rules.46 In contrast to this broad interpretation,
other commentators advocated for reading Madden narrowly since it
ignored any discussion of these two doctrines.47 Some even argued that
Madden may have been decided on a misunderstanding of the law and
should be overturned.48
This led to the second problem with Madden’s holding—the
Second Circuit appears to have misinterpreted the NBA along with
Section 1831d, and their respective interest rate provisions.49 Indeed,
43. See Michael Cumming et al., OCC Madden Rule Is First Step Toward Needed Clarity
for Banks Fintechs and Nonbank Lenders, JD SUPRA (June 5, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/occ-madden-rule-is-first-step-toward-11851/
[https://perma.cc/N8J8-E9CQ] (“Although the court did not directly address the ‘valid when
made’ doctrine, many viewed the decision as an assault on that doctrine, stating
that Madden undercut settled expectations that interest rates, valid at origination, would
continue to be enforceable following a bank’s sale of the loan.”).
44. See, e.g., Jeremy T. Rosenblum, OCC and FDIC Issue Proposed Rules to Undo
Madden,
CONSUMER
FIN.
MONITOR,
(Nov.
21,
2019),
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2019/11/21/occ-and-fdic-issue-proposed-rulesto-undo-madden/ [https://perma.cc/R4PU-4B4T] (tracing the aftermath of Madden and the
uncertainty that it caused to the two doctrines).
45. See Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred,
85 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (“Despite these
authorities, recent developments have created legal uncertainty about the ongoing
permissibility of the interest term after a bank transfers a loan.”).
46. See id. at 3352 (claiming that the “ambiguity created by the silence in section 85
(NBA)” was highlighted and drove the OCC’s authority to promulgate this rule).
47. See id. at 33,531 (citing Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1966) as an
example of the courts deferring to the OCC’s ability to interpret “ambiguity” within the
NBA); but see National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg.
68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (arguing that the NBA is not
interpreting the NBA with its “True Lender” rule but nevertheless reaffirming its authority to
do so in the face of “ambiguity,” again citing Smiley v. Citibank).
48. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 1–2 (“The outcome of the Madden decision involves
a somewhat specific interaction of usury and federal preemption principles, discussed below,
that may not necessarily be broadly replicated in many types of commercial and consumer
loan transactions.”).
49. See id. at 9–10 (discussing how the practice of interest rate exportation and the
applicable law(s) “do not require or impose a separate federal interest rate,” which is the core
of preemption and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, but instead allow covered
institutions to “rely on a single state interest rate” throughout all its lending practices)
(emphasis added).
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both the Second Circuit and the OCC referred to the NBA’s choice of
interest rate law as a “preemption.”50 This interpretation was not only
erroneous, 51 but it likely led to the Court’s failure to account for the
interplay of the Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines with the
matter in front of it.52 As has been recognized in much of the postMadden literature, the NBA, and Section 1831d commentary, true
preemption is when a federal and state law conflict over the same
matter.53 In such instances, the federal law will either explicitly preempt
the state law, or it will impliedly prevail via the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.54
Contrasting this definition with the NBA and Section 1831d
interest rate provisions, it is clear that they function more as a federal
choice of state law.55 Unlike a competition between federal and state law,
both provisions allow a bank to choose the applicable usury law of the

50. See Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred,
85 Fed. Reg. 33,531–33 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (declining
to make a definitive determination on the NBA’s potential preemptive characteristics but
recognizing the debate); see also National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as
Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,743 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (discussing
the potential impact(s) should non-bank lenders be given the “benefits of federal preemption”
without being subject to the OCC’s oversight).
51. See Federal Preemption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The principle
(derived from the Supremacy Clause) that a federal law can supersede or supplant any
inconsistent state law or regulation.”).
52. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 2 (“[W]e conclude that Madden was wrongly
decided due to a misplaced primary focus by the defendants on federal bank preemption
principles, causing the Second Circuit to all but ignore the valid-when-made doctrine.”).
53. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 9–10 (“This interest rate exportation authority,
however, is often discussed as deriving from principles of federal preemption, a notion that is
only partially accurate. In fact, the interest rate exportation authority in Section 85 and Section
27 (collectively, the ‘Exportation Provisions’) constitutes federal ‘preemption’ only in the
sense that it allows an insured depository institution to rely on its home state usury law in
setting the rate(s) of interest for loans to customers in other states rather than the usury law of
the customer’s state of residence. In other words, the interest rate Exportation Provisions do
not require or impose a separate federal interest rate, but instead allow a depository institution
to rely on a single state interest rate.”).
54. See id. at 8 (“The fundamental legal basis of federal preemption in the national bank
context is that because national banks are organized under and derive their powers from
federal law, it is federal, and not state, law that principally governs their activities and
operations. The principle of preemption is grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution . . . .”).
55. See id. at 9 (tracing the Congressional response to an expansive use and interpretation
of state law preemption powers by the OCC and showing how Congress subsequently limited
these abilities in 2008 with Dodd-Frank).
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state of its headquarters. 56 In situations such as Madden, there are no
competing federal and state interest rate laws when applying either the
NBA or Section 1831d.57 Due to the Second Circuit’s insistence on
referring to the situation as “interest rate preemption,” the Court failed to
account for how the NBA should be applied alongside the Valid When
Made and True Lender doctrines.58
Madden’s holding was so shocking to those in the lending
industry that the Second Circuit actually became the subject of case
studies in an attempt to measure its impact on consumer lending.59 While
some analyzed the actual effects of Madden on the secondary lending
market,60 others claimed that the Second Circuit made an erroneous
ruling, and its impact should be limited.61 Because of this debate around
what exactly Madden meant to the Valid When Made and True Lender
doctrines, many commentators called upon the OCC to respond. 62 And
that is exactly what the OCC did.63
56. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001 (2016) (applying 12 U.S.C. § 85 and exhibiting a clear
ability for national banks to choose the application of state usury laws based upon the place
of their headquarters).
57. In Madden, the Second Circuit was arguably swayed not by a competing federal usury
law, but by the framing of the case as a “preemption” matter versus a “valid when made”
matter. For a more thorough discussion on this view, see Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 20–
21 (tracing the different outcomes of Madden depending on how one frames the issues).
58. See id. at 17 (“What is particularly curious about the Madden decision is its singular
focus on the application of National Bank Act preemption to the nonbank defendants without
also taking into account the valid -when-made principle.”).
59. See Colleen Honigsberg et al., How Does Legal Enforceability Affect Consumer
Lending? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 60 THE J. OF LAB. & ECON. 673, 673 (2017)
(studying the impact of Madden on low-credit borrowers and concluding that it “reduced
credit availability for higher-risk borrowers in affected states.”).
60. See id. (analyzing what appeared to be a decrease in loan capital/access for subprime
consumers in the Second Circuit post-Madden); see also Permissible Interest on Loans That
Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (June 2, 2020) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (“Two commenters provided empirical studies analyzing
the effects of the Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC decision, including evidence that Madden
restricted access to credit for higher-risk borrowers in states within the Second Circuit and
that it caused a rise in personal bankruptcies due to a decline in marketplace lending,
especially for low-income households.”).
61. See Robertson, supra note 5 (tracing the aftermath of Madden and how the market has
responded).
62. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,742
(Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7); see also Permissible Interest on Loans That
Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33530 (June 2, 2020) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (stating the sheer volume of comments that the OCC has
received in response to its proposed true lender and valid when made rules).
63. See generally National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed.
Reg. 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7); see also Permissible Interest
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III. THE LENDING WORLD PRE-MADDEN
To properly understand the impact of the Madden-fix rules, it is
necessary to view them through the scope of how the lending market
operated prior to the case.64 This analysis focuses on the Valid When
Made and True Lender doctrines before the OCC’s Madden-fix rules,
along with how federal choice of interest rate law comes into play.65
A.

The Valid When Made Doctrine

The Valid When Made doctrine has arguably existed in various
functions and forms for well over 100 years. 66 At its core, the doctrine
states that an interest rate, which is non-usurious at its inception, does not
become usurious upon subsequent assignment or transfer of the loan.67
The Supreme Court first dealt with this concept in 1833 in the
case Nichols v. Fearson.68 Although it was not concerned with bank
loans, Fearson dealt with the validity of a promissory note’s interest rate
and its interplay with state usury laws. 69 While it never explicitly named
the doctrine, the Court in Fearson recognized that a contract that is nonusurious at its point of creation cannot later be invalidated by a usurious

on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (June 2,
2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160).
64. For good discussions of how the lending market operated prior to Madden, along with
analyses of its impact, see generally Lo, supra note 18, at 65–67 (discussing the role of the
NBA in lending relationships, how it applied along with the OCC’s regulatory authority over
certain lending relationships, and how Madden was likely a misinterpretation of the NBA as
a “preemption” versus a choice of law statute).
65. See infra Part III.A–D.
66. See, e.g., Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. 103 (1833) (providing the first observable
instance of the concept of interest rates remaining valid upon transfer). But see Brief of
Professor Adam J. Levitin as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, In re: Rent-Rite
SuperKegs W. Ltd., 484 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Colo. R., 2012) (No. 1:19-cv-01552-REB)
[hereinafter Brief of Prof. Adam J. Levitin as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant] (arguing
that the Valid When Made doctrine is not as old as people assume it to be and is rather based
off a misunderstanding of older law).
67. See Diego Zuluaga, Invalid When Made: The District Court’s Madden v. Midland
Decision, CATO INST. (Mar. 20, 2018, 9:21 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/invalid-whenmade-district-courts-madden-v-midland-decision
[https://perma.cc/3PXF-K2UU]
(discussing the Valid When Made doctrine and Madden’s impact(s) on it).
68. Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1833) (examining the potential for a
promissory note’s interest rate to continue despite transfer of the note post-execution).
69. See id. at 103–04 (outlining the background of the case, which involved the transfer of
a promissory note and its interplay with applicable usury laws of the time).
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transaction.70 As such, Fearson was likely the beginning of the Valid
When Made doctrine in the United States.71
In 1978 the Supreme Court dealt directly with the NBA—12
U.S.C. § 85—and its deference to state usury laws of the location of a
national bank’s headquarter. 72 In Marquette Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha
Svc. Corp., the Court held that a national bank is located where it is
headquartered and thus may export that state’s interest rate limits to
borrowers located in other states, even if those limits are in excess of
permissible rate(s) in the borrower’s own state.73 In function, the Court
saw the NBA as a permissive grant for a federally chartered bank to
choose the usury laws of its state of headquarters and apply it to loans
across the country.74 However, the Court only analyzed this choice of
law through the lens of the federally regulated bank and its out-of-state
customers but not that of any subsequent transferees of the loan.75 While
the Court recognized the potential for impairment of the usury laws in the
borrower’s state, it claimed that such was the nature of the NBA’s
intent.76
Post-Marquette, national banks largely enjoyed the ability to
choose the usury laws of the state of its headquarters. 77 However, prior
to 1980, state banks had no such choice of law privilege and were limited
by their state’s usury laws and a lack of parity with banks covered by the

70. See id. at 103 (“[A] contract which in its inception is unaffected by usury can never be
invalidated by any subsequent usurious transaction.”).
71. See, e.g., Atherton et al., supra note 13 (citing Fearson as the first example of the “longstanding common law doctrine” of Valid When Made).
72. See Marquette Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha Svc. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978) (applying
the NBA’s choice of law to state usury laws amidst the rise of consumer credit in the 1970’s
and rejecting a preemption argument).
73. Marquette Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha Svc. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 310 (1978) (“The
congressional debates surrounding the enactment of § 30 [the original version of 12 U.S.C. §
85] were conducted on the assumption that a national bank was ‘located’ for purposes of the
section in the State named in its organization certificate.”).
74. See id. (“Omaha bank cannot be deprived of this location merely because it is extending
credit to residents of a foreign State.”).
75. See id. at 312–13 (discussing that the “mere fact” of a bank’s enrollment of a state’s
citizens into loans “does not suffice” to locate the bank in that state for the purposes of usury
law limitations).
76. See id. at 318 (“This impairment, however, has always been implicit in the structure of
the National Bank Act, since citizens of one State were free to visit a neighboring Stat to
receive credit at foreign interest rates.”).
77. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Public Option in Housing Finance, 46
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1111, 1164 (2013) (examining the impact of Marquette specifically on
the housing finance market, but also discussing its overall effects on interest rate and usury
laws throughout the states).
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NBA.78 In 1980, Congress passed 12 U.S.C. § 1831d.79 Acting as a
complement to the NBA, Section 1831d provided a similar privilege for
state-chartered banks, allowing them to choose and enjoy the rates of the
state of their location.80 Together, these acts created a robust system of
banks originating loans and subsequently offloading them to entities
across the country.81
The Valid When Made doctrine impliedly arose in this context.82
After cases such as Fearson and Marquette, lenders assumed that once a
loan was created by a national or state bank, it carried its interest rate with
it through any subsequent sales or transformations.83 This allowed the
doctrine to grow in both its prevalence and in the reliance that lenders
placed upon it.84 Although it was widely utilized, the Valid When Made
doctrine never appeared in anything more than an implied assumption or
relatively dated judicial opinions recognizing it.85 Congress did attempt
to codify the doctrine in 2017.86 However, the contentious bill87 never
78. See, e.g., John J. Schroeder, “Duel” Banking System? State Bank Parity Laws: An
Examination of Regulatory Practice, Constitutional Issues, and Philosophical Questions, 36
INDIANA L. REV. 197, 202 (2003) (tracing parity laws in all the states that have them and
examining how they affect state bank action(s)).
79. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (1980) (showing the same concept(s) as the NBA in terms of
interest rate choice of law, except applicable to state-chartered banks).
80. See id. (mimicking the NBA’s choice of usury law provisions as applied to statechartered banks).
81. See Steven M. Kaplan et al., Review Course on Interest Rate Exportation, K&L GATES
*at 2–5 (2011) https://files.klgates.com/files/upload/interest_exportation_webinar.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BL4Y-JFBV] (providing an overview of the various statutes, including the
NBA and § 1831d which allow for the practice of interest rate exportation).
82. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 148–49 (5th
Cir. 1981) (“The non-usurious character of a note should not change when the note changes
hands.”) (providing an example of the Valid When Made doctrine in action).
83. See Valid-When-Made Doctrine Overview, STRUCTURED FIN. ASS’N * at 2 (Aug. 2019)
https://structuredfinance.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Valid-When-Made_StructuredFinance-Association.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UQQ-QV97] (tracing the reliance that lenders
placed on the doctrine and the negative impact(s) that they predict will be seen if the doctrine
ceases to exist).
84. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 7 (“Certainly, as a business matter, the valid-whenmade principle has been universally relied on in the lending business, inasmuch as the ability
of a loan transferee to rely upon the enforceability and collectability in full of a loan that is
validly made is central to the stability and liquidity of the domestic loan markets, to say
nothing of core principles of commercial dealing.”).
85. See id. at 7 n.29–30 (noting examples of case law that recognized the Valid When Made
doctrine but also noting their relative age and lack of recent developments).
86. See Protecting Consumers’ Access to Credit Act of 2017, H.R. Res. 3299, 115th Cong.
§ 2(2)(3) (2018) (as referred to S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Feb. 15,
2018) (offering the only attempt at codifying the Valid When Made doctrine).
87. See Levitin: ‘Madden-fix’ Bills, supra note 8 (arguing that the bill is based upon a
“faulty reading of case law”).
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became law. 88 Congress’ failure to codify the Valid When Made doctrine
makes the OCC’s Madden-fix rules that much more impactful,89
potentially leaving it open to reversal.90
B.

The Valid When Made Doctrine in Action

As Marquette and its progeny developed and attempts at
codification failed, complaints that courts and Congress largely
misunderstood the proper application of the Valid When Made doctrine
arose. 91 Like many of those complaints, the Madden court may very well
have underestimated the reach of its holding beyond third-party loan
purchasers.92 In particular, the Madden court did little to look beyond its
holding and the potential impacts it might have on marketplace lenders,
including the rise of fintechs and their business models.93
Known colloquially as “marketplace lending,” many lending
businesses are predicated on an ability to assume non-usurious loans and

88. See H.R. Res. 3299, 115th Cong. § 2(2)(3) (2018) (as referred to S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Feb. 15, 2018) (showing that the bill never made it out of its
Senate subcommittee and is therefore null).
89. There is a tenable argument that the OCC’s codification of the Madden-fix rules in fact
violate the non-delegation doctrine. See John Hannon, The True Lender Doctrine: Function
over Form as a Reasonable Constraint on the Exportation of Interest Rates, 67 DUKE L.J.
1261, 1289 (2018). For the purposes of this Note, it is enough to recognize that Congress’s
failure to pass any bill related to the doctrines may evince a lack of consensus by legislators
on how to address the problem. Id. at 1290 n.161 (“Congress could, of course, codify the basic
principles of the [T]rue [L]ender doctrine. But the fact-bound application of such a statute is
certain to rest, at some level of review, with the courts—where the doctrine already exists.”).
90. This Note mentions the possibility that the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) could
potentially come into play for reversing either of the two Madden-fix rule, however this seems
unlikely. See infra Part V.
91. See, e.g., Brief of Prof. Adam J. Levitin as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, supra
note 66, at 35 (concluding that the Valid When Made doctrine is a work of fiction and not a
facet of common law).
92. See Hannon, supra note 89, at 1277 (“Several facets of the Madden opinion suggest
that the court was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to withhold the benefits of the
exportation doctrine from nonbank entities.”).
93. See Peter Conti-Brown, Can Fintech Increase Lending? How Courts Are Undermining
Financial
Inclusion,
BROOKINGS
INST.
(Apr.
16,
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/can-fintech-increase-lending-how-courts-areundermining-financial-inclusion/ [https://perma.cc/DDY5-Z6E4] (“The Madden court
reached the conclusion but without much relevant explanation: so long as the defendants
weren’t agents of national banks (or national banks themselves), then the national law does
not apply. Or, as the Court concluded with its awkward syntax, those institutions ‘acted solely
on their own behalves, as owners of the debt.’”).
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interest rates from national and state banks. 94 Marketplace lenders have
long relied on the assumption of the Valid When Made doctrine in
conducting their businesses.95 These companies can even be in the
business of soliciting lending relationships with consumers while
simultaneously transacting with banks to originate and immediately
offload the loan to the marketplace lender themselves. 96 For example,
Sindeo, a fintech platform, provides low-interest and easily accessible
first-time home loans as well as quick refinancing options to consumers,
relying on the ability to work with banks to originate and sell off
mortgages.97 Companies such as these can offer convenient new
elements and access to the lending market for both consumers and banks,
but they often exist because of these lending arrangements with state and
national banks.98 Alone, a company like Sindeo could not use the
statutory choices of either the NBA or Section 1831d to choose an interest
rate for its loan, and instead is subject to each state’s usury laws. 99
In what has been characterized as a “win-win-win” scenario,100
fintechs can also provide banks with technology that is much more adept
94. See id. (“[F]intech is also helpful in permitting new specializations to grow within the
financial system such that not everyone must go to the banking juggernauts . . . for every
financial service.”); see also Christopher K. Odinet, Securitizing Digital Debts, 52 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 477, 527–34 (2020) (discussing the pros and cons of the rise of financial technology
companies and online lending).
95. See id. at 532–34 (analyzing the role of the Valid When Made and True Lender
doctrines alongside fintech lending relationships and marketplace lending models).
96. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. COMM’N, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, MARKETPLACE LENDING
(Winter
2015)
at
13
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwin15/SI_Winter2015
.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC7L-Z2JJ] [hereinafter FDIC: Marketplace Lending] (providing a
thorough explanation of common forms of marketplace lending and bank-secondary lender
partnerships).
97. Known collectively as the “Freedom Financial Network,” this collection of Fintechs,
including Sindeo, provide services ranging from mortgage calculators, to full debtrestructuring programs. Many of these rely on the interplay of bank interest rate choice of law
and the ability for the companies to assume various customers’ loans. See Our Companies,
FREEDOM FIN. NETWORK https://www.freedomfinancialnetwork.com/our_companies
[https://perma.cc/442S-6L4L] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021) (offering examples of a wide range
of debt and lending services from Sindeo’s parent company, Freedom Financial Network).
98. See Artur Bachynskyi, Top-11 US Lending Startups That are Disrupting the Real
Estate Industry, DJANGOSTARS (2020), https://djangostars.com/blog/lending-fintech-startups/
[https://perma.cc/932Y-LTXG] (claiming that the rise in Fintech lending services will only
continue to grow).
99. Neither Sindeo nor Freedom Financial Network is a national or state-chartered-bank,
nor are they an agent of one. Therefore, the NBA and section 1831d would not apply to them.
12 U.S.C. § 85 (1980); 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (1989).
100. See Zac Robinson, True Integrated Receivables—A Win-Win-Win for Banks,
Corporate Customers and FinTechs, FTNI, https://www.ftni.com/blog/true-integrated-
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at dealing with small-dollar lending while banks can originate and offload
loans to them.101 In fact, San Francisco-based fintech Aura received a
$10 million investment to expand its offerings of small-dollar lending
services and to increase its partnership(s) with banks.102 Companies such
as Aura generally operate in what is often referred to as a “bank
partnership model.”103 In the typical bank partnership model, a
marketplace lender, such as FIA Card Services in Ms. Madden’s case,104
might act as an intermediary to facilitate a loan, referring it to a chartered
financial institution to make with its choice of interest rate. 105 While the
financial institution is the one who generally disburses the funds to the
borrower, it will almost immediately sell the loan to the marketplace
lender.106 That marketplace lender might also receive some fee or
incentive from the bank if they somehow helped originate the loan.107
receivables-a-win-win-win-for-banks-corporate-customers-and-fintechs
[https://perma.cc/8625-VN5E] (outlining the benefits for all parties when technology is added
to ease and promote lending) (last visited Sept. 22, 2020).
101. See Mary Jackson, There’s a Better Way to Regulate Small-Dollar Lending, AM.
BANKER (Dec. 4, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/theres-a-betterway-to-regulate-small-dollar-lending [https://perma.cc/FC9F-ZAQW] (arguing that
Congress should focus on passing bills to promote bank-fintech partnerships).
102. See Will Hernandez, Small-Dollar Lending Fintech Attracts Prudential Backing, AM.
BANKER (June 25, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/small-dollar-lendingfintech-attracts-prudential-backing [https://perma.cc/3AAA-6XEF] (offering an example of a
fast-growing Fintech and tracing its marketplace impact).
103. A very comprehensive analysis of the typical “bank partnership model” can be found
from FDIC: Marketplace Lending, supra note 96, at 13–18 (offering a flowchart of how these
lending relationships typically function, followed by a discussion of their role in the market).
104. It is important to note that, while FIA Card Services was a chartered institution, not
all marketplace lenders are. See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 248 (2d
Cir. 2015) (noting that FIA card services or “FIA Card Services N.A.” is a National
Association—a form of federal charter granted by the OCC). But see, e.g., Marc Franson &
Peter Manbeck, The Regulation of Marketplace Lending: A Summary of the Principal Issues,
Chapman
at
*25
(Apr.
2019)
https://www.chapman.com/media/publication/926_Chapman_Regulation_of_Marketplace_
Lending_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/86GK-WSVM] (exploring ways that the OCC has
sought to regulate fintechs and marketplace lenders, including the use of “special-purpose
bank charters” but noting that no such practice currently exists).
105. See FDIC: Marketplace Lending, supra note 96, at 14 (“In these cases, the
[marketplace lender] collects borrower applications, assigns the credit grade, and solicits
investor interest. However, from that point the [marketplace lender] refers the completed loan
application packages to the partner bank that makes the loan to the borrower.”).
106. See id. (“The partner bank typically holds the loan . . . . before selling it to the
[marketplace lender]. Once the [marketplace lender] purchases the loan from the partner bank,
it issues security notes up to the purchase amount to its retail investors who pledged to fund
the loan.”).
107. See id. at 13 fig. 2 (showing one potential incentivized route to marketplace lending
arrangements between banks affiliated with marketplace companies and marketplace
lenders/investors).
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They might even choose to sell the loan to another lender. 108 These sort
of fees and incentive payments are what many fintechs base their business
models on and why the Valid When Made doctrine is seen as so crucial
to their existence.109 Without any Valid When Made doctrine, non-bank
marketplace lenders could not help facilitate and buy loans with higher
interest rates, as they could not enjoy any applicable choice of usury law
from either the NBA or 12 U.S.C. § 1831d.110
Fintechs also provide accessible banking and lending interfaces
for consumers, as well as easier access to credit.111 In addition to
benefiting the customer, banks enjoy the rise in potential customers and
diversified lending opportunities.112 According to one commentator, only
30% of users find traditional banking features “easy to use,” yet fintechs
can streamline and enhance a quick-lending experience.113 In return for
their services, these marketplace lenders may receive a fee or percentage
from successfully cultivated loans.114 Some are even in the business of
purchasing and managing the loans themselves.115

108. See id. (showing another common route of debt transformation through the re-selling
of an acquired loan to another marketplace lending arrangement).
109. For a discussion on the valuable roles of fintechs in the U.S. economy, along with a
discussion of how they have evolved and shifted their various business models, see Geoff
Charles, The New Wave of FinTech Lending – 7 Essential Strategies, MEDIUM (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://medium.com/@geoffcharles/the-new-wave-of-fintech-lending-7-essential-strategiescba5ac341910 [https://perma.cc/JB9V-SNEC] (offering examples of how Fintechs have
shifted their lending models to increase their incentives, such as student loans and creating
income sharing agreements instead of traditional loan arrangements).
110. See supra Part III.A (discussing the NBA and its sister interest rate choice of law
statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1831d).
111. See Jackson, supra note 101 (observing that for many Americans, limited access to
credit is “self-perpetuating” and that fintechs are uniquely poised to help address the issue).
112. See FDIC: Marketplace Lending, supra note 96, at 12 (“Attracted by opportunities
for earnings growth, some banks have entered the marketplace lending business either as
investors or through third-party arrangements.”)
113. See Laura Dreschler, Four Ways Fintech Has Changed the Lending Process and How
Other Financial Institutions Can Keep Up, EXPERIAN (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://www.experian.com/blogs/insights/2019/03/4-ways-fintech-changed-lending/
[https://perma.cc/9NH4-RUCQ] (discussing the positive impact(s) that fintechs have had on
the lending market and offering suggestions as to how other lending institutions can stay
competitive).
114. See Jon Marino, Online Lenders Turned This Fee Into a Cash Cow, CNBC (May 6,
2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/06/online-lenders-turned-this-fee-into-a-cash-cowfintech-startups-lending.html [https://perma.cc/DVD9-6ZVU] (tracing how Fintech Lending
Club created a “lucrative source of revenue” by collecting loan origination fees).
115. See Paul Sullivan, Fintechs Fill a Gap, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2020, at B3 (exploring the
role of Fintechs who have gotten in the business of originating and assuming Paycheck
Protection Program small-business loans during COVID-19).
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Moreover, it is not just fintechs who relied upon the Valid When
Made doctrine to grow and operate their businesses.116 Debt collection
agencies and smaller lenders with less access to capital have utilized the
doctrine for much longer.117 In fact, Midland Funding, LLC, the named
defendant in Madden, is a secondary debt collection agency with a
business focused on buying past-due loan accounts in bulk from banks
and marketplace lenders.118 In total, marketplace lending accounts for an
over $1 trillion dollar per-year industry.119 This is hardly a negligible
impact, but it is all predicated on a single assumption: that the Valid
When Made doctrine is indeed good law.120
The growth of fintechs within the secondary lending market has
unquestionably helped both banks and their customers.121 However, one
might notice that an unbridled embracing of the Valid When Made
doctrine could allow much more unscrupulous lending arrangements to
thrive.122 Entities such as “payday lenders”—who offer consumers quick
access to capital in exchange for exorbitant interest rates—are generally
what come to mind.123 If left without redress, these consumers could fall
116. See generally Brief of the Structured Fin. Indus. Grp., Inc. & the Sec. Indus. & Fin.
Mkts.
Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786
F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015), 136 S. Ct. 2505 (No. 15-610), cert. denied, (illustrating the size and
breadth of the secondary lending market).
117. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 802, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (1977)
(providing an example of prohibitions and regulations affecting debt collection practices once
a debt is assumed).
118. FAQS About Midland Credit Management, MIDLAND FUNDING (2020),
https://www.midlandfunding.com/faqs-mcm/ [ttps://perma.cc/4REU-RUT3] (noting that
Midland Funding is a debt collector and “buys consumer debt”).
119. Lo, supra note 18, at 64 (“Commentators have observed that [Madden] could sink the
trillion-dollar secondary credit market.”).
120. See Press Release, Marketplace Lending Ass’n, Valid When Made (Aug. 2017),
http://marketplacelendingassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Valid-When-Made-1Pager-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/22D9-FLKF] (discussing the background of the Valid
When Made doctrine, the reliance on it by marketplace lenders, and the—at the time
pending—bill in Congress to codify the doctrine).
121. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 100 (providing examples of how the growth of fintechs
has helped banks and customers expand their markets and offerings).
122. See Jayne Munger, Crossing State Lines: The Trojan Horse Invasion of Rent-A-Bank
and Rent-A-Tribe Schemes in Modern Usury Law, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 468, 486–87 (2019)
(noting that the difficulty with states deciding whether a loan transaction is in violation of
their usury laws arises from the fact that many Rent-A-Bank and Rent-A-Tribe schemes are
not, technically speaking, illegal).
123. See, e.g., Scott Andrew Schaaf, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday
Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 340 (2001) (discussing the development and
role(s) of agency oversight and regulation over the payday lending industry, along with
analyzing how effective said regulation(s) have been); see also Tasha L. Winebarger, The
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victim to such lenders who take advantage of the Valid When Made
doctrine to partner with a bank who can originate a predatory loan and
immediately sell it to the secondary lender.124 To combat this, states and
courts commonly employed the True Lender doctrine, aimed at thwarting
these predatory schemes.125
C.

The True Lender Doctrine

While the Valid When Made doctrine finds its roots in decades
of common law, the True Lender doctrine is a relatively new concept. 126
The True Lender doctrine was first seen in both judge-made and
legislative forms,127 and it was widely employed in the wake of the 2008
recession.128 To date, it has remained frequent in use, allowing courts
and law enforcement to look deeper into a loan’s details in search of
predatory practices. 129 Despite its widespread usage post-2008, the True
Lender doctrine can actually be traced to a much earlier rise in scrutiny

Beginning of the End: The Demise of Bank Partnerships With Payday Lenders, 7 N.C.
BANKING INST. 317, 318 (2003) (tracing the rise in payday lenders after financial crises).
124.
See
What
Is
a
Payday
Loan?,
CFPB
(June
2,
2017),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-payday-loan-en-1567/
[https://perma.cc/UL3R-WYFY] (defining a payday loan as one that is typically short-term
with high cost/interest rate, and is generally due at one’s next payday).
125. See Munger, supa note 122, at 487 (“‘True [L]ender’ claims were first asserted against
payday lenders who used rent-a-bank arrangements to evade state usury limits, and similar
claims have been successfully asserted more recently in rent-a-tribe schemes.”).
126. See Hannon, supra note 89, at 1280 (“The [T]rue [L]ender doctrine traces its origins
to an effort by Georgia’s legislature to eliminate in-state payday lenders that were
circumventing the state’s usury laws by entering into rent-a-charter arrangements with outof-state banks.”).
127. The first judicial application of the True Lender doctrine appears to have come from
New York in 2007. Hannon, supra note 89, at 1281 (quoting People ex rel. Spitzer v. Cty.
Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 846 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App. Div.2007)); But see Ga. Code Ann.
§ 16-17-2(b)(4) (2011) (exemplifying a statutory interpretation of the True Lender doctrine).
128. See Hannon, supra note 89, at 1264 (“The [T]rue [L]ender test arose in the context of
perhaps the most egregious extension of the ability to preempt state usury laws, wherein
payday lenders and other nonbank entities have periodically obtained the benefits of the
exportation doctrine by utilizing an arrangement commonly referred to as ‘rent-a-charter.’”).
129. See, e.g., West Virginia v. CashCall, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 781, 783 (S.D. W.Va. 2009)
(showcasing an application of the True Lender doctrine in which a court looked beyond the
mere form of a loan/lending relationship in the midst of an apparent “Rent-A-Bank” scheme);
see also, Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Bus. Oversight DBO Launches Investigation Into
Possible Evasion of Cal.’s New Int. Rate Caps by Prominent Auto Title Lender, LoanMart
(Sept. 3, 2020), https://dfpi.ca.gov/ [https://perma.cc/KKT2-KXCA] (announcing a new
action by the California Department of Business Oversight into a potential predatory lender).
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regarding certain forms of lending relationships.130 In what became
popularly known as “Rent-A-Charter” or “Rent-A-Bank”131
arrangements, the United States as a whole started to become more aware
of the ability for lenders to exploit an unqualified Valid When Made
doctrine.132 Any time there is a dramatic rise in predatory lending
targeting poor-credit and at-risk borrowers federal and state governments
have needed to respond.133 Prior to the OCC’s Madden-fix rules, the
interplay of the True Lender and Valid When Made doctrines was a
successful tool in protecting consumers.134
The background of the True Lender doctrine began as many
predatory lenders would partner with a nationally chartered bank in the
aforementioned schemes. 135 In such arrangements, a bank would
originate a loan, enabling the interest rate preemption granted by the NBA
or Section 1831d.136 The bank would then immediately offload the loan
to a predatory lender who had typically arranged the transaction with the
bank beforehand.137 The predatory lender could then charge the often
exorbitant interest rate under the protection of the Valid When Made
doctrine.138
130. See, e.g., Winebarger, supra note 123, at 318 (citing Schaaf, supra note 123, at 340)
(tracing the first rise of payday lenders to the 1980’s and an increased prevalence in consumers
seeking short term loans); see also Scott A. Hefner, Payday Lending in North Carolina: Now
You See It, Now You Don’t, 11 N.C. BANKING INST. 263, 271–74 (2007) (examining the
history of payday lending in North Carolina during the mid 1990’s alongside the OCC’s
response to regulation).
131. For a good discussion of the common features and history of these arrangements, see
Munger, supra note 122, at 471–76.
132. See id. at 487–90 (noting the first application of “True Lender claims” against those
entities that exploited the Valid When Made doctrine).
133. See Kat Aaron, Predatory Lending: A Decade of Warnings, THE CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY
(May
6,
2009),
https://publicintegrity.org/inequality-povertyopportunity/predatory-lending-a-decade-of-warnings/ [https://perma.cc/4524-85DV] (tracing
the history of various laws and regulations and how predatory lenders would attempt to usurp
state laws and how states responded).
134. See Hannon, supra note 89, at 1264–65 (pinpointing the function and success(es) of
the two doctrines).
135. See Munger, supra note 122, at 475–79 (surveying the history of “Rent-A-Bank” and
“Rent-A-Charter” arrangements and various state responses to them).
136. See id. at 476 (outlining the development of the NBA and exportation of interest rates,
along with the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and its impact on bank chartering and choosing
headquarters locations).
137. See id. at 477 (“In these arrangements, the alternative lender takes care of all the
marketing and advertising, and the bank’s name is placed on the loan documents. The bank
subsequently sells the loan to the lender, sometimes within twenty-four hours.”).
138. See Christopher Baiamonte, Stopping Third-Party Debt Buyers from Using National
Bank Act Preemption to Dodge State Usury Laws, 69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 127, 145 (2019)
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In some instances, predatory lenders would charge interest rates
in excess of hundreds or even thousands of percent. 139 Some
organizations even began to establish predatory lender watchlists to
inform states and consumers before entering into a loan.140 However, the
vast majority of banks have never engaged in predatory lending practices
or arrangements. 141 Indeed, both the OCC and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) have issued warnings against such
relationships and their damaging impact(s) on the banking industry’s
image.142 However, the mere existence of these lending arrangements
and the potential problems they pose led many lenders to worry about the
range of variability in the True Lender inquiries being applied across the
country.143

(noting that the most infamous predatory lending scheme, the “Payday Loan,” is proven to
take advantage of sub-prime borrowers by charging “exorbitant interest rates”).
139. As recently as June 5, 2020, the District of Columbia Attorney General announced a
lawsuit utilizing the True Lender Inquiry against an infamous payday lender, Elevate, who
regularly partners with FinWiseBank, a federally chartered bank in Utah, to offload loans. See
Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. for the Dist. of Columbia, AG Racine Sues Predatory
Lender for Illegal High-Interest Loans to District Consumers (June, 2020),
https://oag.dc.gov/release/ag-racine-sues-predatory-online-lender-illegal
[https://perma.cc/Y77K-JTBZ] (pointing to how Elevate would regularly charge interest rates
of up to 251-percent while “misrepresenting” its lending relationships).
140. See High-Cost Rent-a-Bank Loan Watch List, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. (2020),
https://www.nclc.org/issues/high-cost-small-loans/rent-a-bank-loan-watch-list.html
[https://perma.cc/S7DK-MR99] (showcasing a comprehensive map and overview of
predatory lenders found in each state).
141. See Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (observing
that most banks do not engage in Rent-A-Bank arrangements because of their implications on
operations and practices).
142. The OCC has opined that predatory lending practices may involve “unfair and
deceptive trade practices in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.” Similarly, the
FDIC has said that predatory lending activities are “inconsistent with safe and sound lending
and undermine individual, family, and community economic well-being.” OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER AL 2003-2, GUIDELINES FOR
NATIONAL BANKS TO GUARD AGAINST PREDATORY AND ABUSIVE LENDING PRACTICES (2003);
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC INSTITUTION LETTERS FIL-6-2007, PREDATORY LENDING
FDIC’S POLICY ON PREDATORY LENDING (2007).
143. See Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (discussing
the variations in approaches to the Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines across the
country).
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Applying the True Lender Doctrine

In response to these predatory lending arrangements, many courts
began to look beyond the simple question of whether or not a loan’s
interest rate was valid if made by a bank.144 Instead, both legislative
directives and their own initiatives allowed courts to examine deeper into
the nature of a suspect lending relationship.145 In their varying versions
of the True Lender doctrine, courts often found themselves reviewing
suspect loans or lending relationships by looking at factors146 such as: (1)
how long the originator held the loan before assigning it to a third
party;147 (2) whether the third party provided the original lender with the
capital to make the loan; 148 (3) if the third party and lender had a
prearranged agreement to pay minimum fees to the lender 149 or even
indemnify it;150 and (4) how the loan was reported.151
In practice, the Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines
worked in tandem. 152 The former granted a blanket acceptance for a state
or national bank to choose the interest rates of their place of headquarters
before offloading it.153 The latter allowed states to enforce such laws
against clearly predatory lending relationships if it appeared that the
predatory lender, rather than the bank, was the true lender. 154 Up until
Madden and the OCC’s “Madden-fix,” these two doctrines appeared to
be strongly accepted throughout the lending market.155
144. Hannon, supra note 89, at 1265 (“In contrast to the inflexible and overbroad approach
of the Madden court, the [T]rue [L]ender doctrine looks past the superficial form of rent-acharter arrangements to ascertain whether the bank that is entitled to the preemption of state
laws is the real lender receiving such protection.”).
145. See Adam Rust, Federal Regulators Should Refrain From Making a True Lender
Rule, NAT’L COMTY REINVESTMENT COAL. (July 10, 2020) https://ncrc.org/
[https://perma.cc/VJ6L-HFSE] (pointing out examples of state enforcements of their usury
laws via the use of the True Lender doctrine); see also Hannon, supra note 89, at 1280 (tracing
the True Lender doctrine’s history in the US to a law in Georgia, GA. Code Ann. § 16-172(b)(4) (2011)).
146. The following references and factors have been taken directly from the OCC’s survey
of the True Lender doctrine and can be found in: National Banks and Federal Savings
Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,224 (proposed July 20, 2020) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 7) (proposing the new True Lender rule and tracing traditional approaches to the
doctrine).
147. See, e.g., CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15– 7522–JFW, 2016 WL 4820635, at *56 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016) (examining ‘‘which party or entity has the predominant economic
interest in the transaction,’’ including evaluating which party placed its money at risk).
148. See id. at *6 (concluding that the third party was the True Lender, including because
‘‘[a]lthough [the third party] waited a minimum of three days after the funding of each loan
before purchasing it, it is undisputed that [the third party] purchased each and every loan
before any payments on the loan had been made.’’); see also CashCall, Inc. v. Morrisey, No.
12– 1274, 2014 WL 2404300, at *1-7 (W.Va. May 30, 2014) (noting that the third party
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IV. THE MADDEN-FIX RULES—THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
Between early June and the middle of October of 2020, the OCC
issued and eventually published two rules in response to Madden.156
Similarly, the FDIC published its own Valid When Made rule, with calls
for it to release a True Lender rule as well.157 Almost immediately after
publication, several state attorney generals filed suit against both the

purchased loans within three days of origination but not clearly indicating whether this fact
was considered as part of the predominant economic interest analysis); see also Sawyer v.
Bill Me Later, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1369 (D. Utah 2014) (noting that the named lender
was the real party in interest, including because it ‘‘holds the credit receivables for two
days’’).
149. See, e.g., CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15– 7522–JFW, 2016 WL 4820635, at
*2,*6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016) (‘‘[The third party] guaranteed [the named lender] a
minimum payment of $100,000 per month, as well as a $10,000 monthly administrative fee.’’)
(‘‘It is undisputed that [the third party] deposited enough money into a reserve account to
fund two days of loans, calculated on the previous month’s daily average and that [the named
lender] used this money to fund consumer loans.’’).
150. Id. at *3 (‘‘[The third party] agreed to ‘fully indemnify [the named lender] for all costs
arising or resulting from any and all civil, criminal or administrative claims or actions . . . .’
’’); see also CashCall, Inc. v. Morrisey, No. 12– 1274, 2014 WL 2404300, at *7 (W.Va. May
30, 2014) (noting that the Circuit Court found that the third party agreed to indemnify the
named lender).
151. See CashCall, 2014 WL 2404300, at *1–7 (noting that loans were treated as if they
were funded by the third party for financial reporting purposes).
152. Hannon, supra note 89, at 1275–76 n. 87 (“Stated another way, the [T]rue [L]ender
doctrine seeks to identify whether loans truly were valid-when-made, and only an affirmative
answer will even trigger application of the Madden fix law.”).
153. Munger, supra note 122, at 487 (“’True lender’ claims were first asserted against
payday lenders who used rent-a-bank arrangements to evade state usury limits, and similar
claims have been successfully asserted more recently in rent-a-tribe schemes.”) (citing CFPB
v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15-7522-JFW (RAOx), 2016 WL 4820635, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
31, 2016)).
154. Supra Part II.A–B.
155. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 7 (noting that the reliance of lenders on the
doctrines and how, prior to Madden, there appeared to be no reason to question their
application).
156. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg.
68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (announcing the OCC’s final True
Lender rule on October 30, 2020); see also Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold,
Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530-36 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (announcing the OCC’s final Valid When Made rule on June 2,
2020).
157. The FDIC version of the Valid When Made rule covers all state-chartered banks and
insured branches of foreign banks. See Federal Interest Rate Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,146
(July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 331). Note that the FDIC has not introduced a
“True Lender” rule as of the writing of this Note.
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OCC and FDIC opposing these rules.158 However, these suits all focused
on potential violations of the Administrative Procedure Act. 159 Outside
advocacy groups have also threatened suit, largely focusing on the rules’
impact on vulnerable consumers in the context of the COVID-19 national
pandemic.160 As one suit claims, in the midst of unemployment rates that
have not been seen since the Great Depression, the OCC is “pushing hard
and fast” for rules that will “embolden predatory lenders” to take
advantage of struggling families.161 And for one to fully appreciate the
opposition to these rules, it is first necessary to examine the Madden-fix
itself.162
A.

The Valid When Made and True Lender Doctrines

The first of the two Madden-fix rules dealt with the Valid When
Made doctrine. 163 In its final rule, the OCC stated that a loan’s interest
rate that originates with a bank stays with the loan regardless of sale,

158. See California v. OCC, No. 4:20-cv-05200 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2020) (showing the
major lawsuit filed by several states Attorneys General against the OCC for its Madden-fix
rules); see also, California v. FDIC, No. 4:20-cv-05860 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 20, 2020) (showing
the major lawsuit filed by several states Attorneys General against the FDIC for its Maddenfix rules).
159. FDIC, No. 4:20-cv-05860, at 6 (“This action arises under the Administrative
Procedure Act.”).
160. NCLC Press Release, supra note 26 (arguing that the OCC’s proposed “True Lender”
rule is unconstitutional and threatening a lawsuit upon its passing).
161. Id. (“It is shocking that in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic with unemployment
at a level not seen since the Great Depression that the OCC is pushing hard and fast on a
proposal that will embolden predatory lenders while trapping many struggling families with
long-term debt.”).
162. The combination of the two final rules issued by the OCC in response to Madden are
colloquially referred to as the “Madden-fix” by many commentators. Almost immediately
after its holding was published, the OCC has been vocal in its opposition to Madden’s holding,
thus seeking to “fix” it. See James Kim & Jeremy T. Rosenblum, Three State Attack on the
OCC’s
“Madden-Fix”
Rule,
JD
SUPRA
(Aug.
4,
2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/three-state-attack-on-the-occ-s-madden-18013/
[https://perma.cc/4Q4T-WXST] (noting that the OCC’s opposition to Madden’s holding
began under the Obama Administration). For a good introduction to the OCC’s two rules that
form the Madden-fix, see Cumming et. al, supra note 43 (offering an overview of the OCC’s
Valid When Made doctrine rule); see also Wilmarth Jr., supra note 23 (discussing the OCC’s
True Lender doctrine rule and offering criticisms and reasons why it should be withdrawn).
163. See Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred,
85 Fed. Reg. 33,530-36 (June 2, 2020) (showing the OCC’s final Valid When Made rule); see
also Robertson, supra note 14 (discussing the various approaches to interpreting Madden’s
holding and observing where and how some began to initially question the viability of the
Valid When Made doctrine).
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transfer, or assignment.164 This rule simply took the Valid When Made
doctrine and granted it a seat of official recognition as a complement to
the NBA and Section 1831d’s choice of state usury laws.165 According
to the OCC, Section 85 of the NBA was “conspicuous” in its silence on
the impact of loan assignments on the loan’s interest rate, 166 authorizing
it to address the Valid When Made doctrine even when Madden did
not.167
Almost immediately, the OCC was criticized for failing to seize
the moment and answer the question of how deeply courts should look to
discover a loan’s true lender, and what they should they look for.168 This
criticism arose both from those who saw the opportunity to offer more
consistency across the market post-Madden,169 but arguably more

164. Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85
Fed. Reg. 33,530 (June 2, 2020) (“[B]anks are generally authorized to sell, assign, or
otherwise transfer loans and to enter into and assign loan contracts. . . . [R]ecent developments
have created legal uncertainty about the ongoing permissibility of the interest term after a
bank transfers a loan. This rule clarifies that when a bank transfers a loan, the interest
permissible before the transfer continues to be permissible after the transfer.”) (emphasis
added).
165. The OCC’s ruling spent a significant amount of time discussing questions of whether
it had the authority under the NBA to issue such a pronouncement. While the OCC of course
claimed that it did, this issue is also at the center of some of the aforementioned litigation by
the states Attorneys General. See State of California v. OCC, No. 4:20-cv-05200 (N.D. Cal.
July 29, 2020); see also Brian S. Korn, et al., OCC Affirms “Valid When Made” Doctrine,
MANATT (June 3, 2020), https://www.manatt.com/insights/newsletters/client-alert/occaffirms-valid-when-made-doctrine [https://perma.cc/Q5H6-ZWMY] (stating the Comptroller
of the Currency, Brian Brooks’ stance on the OCC’s final Valid When Made rule).
166. Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85
Fed. Reg. 33,531 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (“Therefore,
section 85’s (NBA) silence in this regard is ‘conspicuous[ ],’ and the OCC may interpret
section 85 to resolve this silence.”)
167. Id. at 33,530 (“Many supporting commenters also agreed that the OCC has the
authority to address this issue by regulation and that the proposal reflected a permissible
interpretation of relevant Federal banking law.”).
168. See, e.g., Comment Letter from the Conference of State Bank Supervisors to the OCC,
(Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.csbs.org/policy/csbs-comment-letter-permissible-interest-loansare-sold-assigned-or-otherwise-transferred [https://perma.cc/GG3F-HZS5] [hereinafter
Conference of State Bank Supervisors Comment Letter] (requesting that the OCC “clarify and
revise the proposed rule to ensure that its impact on state law rights and remedies—including
the [T]rue [L]ender doctrine and other state law requirements—does not exceed the stated
intention of the proposed rule.”).
169. See id. (asking the OCC to clarify its Valid When Made rule to offer more market
consistency and understanding); see also Rosenblum, supra note 44 (explaining the OCC’s
claimed reasoning for not addressing the True Lender doctrine originally).
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worrisome, also from the lobbying and pressuring efforts of payday
lenders and other potentially predatory businesses.170
In response, the OCC issued its interpretation of when and how
to tell if the bank is the true lender in a loan.171 In the OCC’s view,
whenever a bank makes a loan—which it must do for the NBA or Section
1831d’s choice of usury laws to even apply in the first place—it is the
true lender if it is named as such or if it provides the financial resources
for the loan.172 The OCC also stated that if one bank is named as the
lender, but another party funds the loan, it is the named bank who is the
true lender. 173 According to the OCC, these rules were intended to offer
clarity and certainty to the secondary lending market.174 While they very
while might have created the desired certainty, these rules left some key
questions unanswered.175 In response to over 4,000 comment letters—
many of which expressed concern that this rule would allow for predatory
lenders to circumvent state usury laws—the OCC rejected this fear,
stating that its “robust supervisory framework” would prevent such
occurrences.176

170. See, e.g., California v. OCC, No. 4:20-cv-05200 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2020) (explaining
payday lender lobbying efforts in opposition of state usury laws); see also Munger, supra note
122, at 468–98 (discussing other lobbying efforts by the payday loan industry to fight
consumer protection laws).
171. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg.
68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (finalizing the OCC’s True Lender
doctrine rule).
172. See id. (“Under this rule, a bank makes a loan if, as of the date of origination, it is
named as the lender in the loan agreement or funds the loan.”).
173. See id. at 68,745 (“[W]here one bank is named as the lender in the loan agreement
and another bank funds the loan, the bank named as the lender in the loan agreement makes
the loan.”).
174. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg.
44,223, 44,224 (proposed July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (“To address this
uncertainty, the OCC is proposing a clear test to determine when a bank makes a loan.”); see
also Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85
Fed. Reg. 33,530–36 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (“Consistent
with the proposal, this regulation addresses that legal uncertainty by clarifying and reaffirming
the longstanding understanding that a bank may transfer a loan without affecting the
permissible interest term.”).
175. Note that this blog post was written before the OCC’s True Lender doctrine rule.
However, it provides good insight into an example of the types of questions that were typically
asked and discussed by commentators to the OCC’s Madden-fix rules. See Curtin et al., supra
note 17 (observing that the Madden-fix for the Valid When Made doctrine failed to address
state-chartered banks and, at the time, the True Lender doctrine question).
176. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,745
(Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (emphasizing the OCC’s “robust supervisory
framework” in protecting consumers and overseeing banks).
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Positives of the Madden-Fix (the Good)

This form-over-substance approach by the OCC has many
practical issues,177 but it may well provide some of the answers that
Madden’s observers sought.178 Undoubtedly, the Madden-fix garnered a
collective sigh of relief for the multitude of marketplace lenders that
relied upon these doctrines.179 As the OCC pointed out in its rulemaking
commentary, the questions created by Madden left many banks
wondering if they could still use the “risk management tool” of offloading
risky debts and loans to free up capital.180 As support for both of its rules,
the OCC pointed to the uncertainty that it perceived to be plaguing the
lending market and used it as justification for its new rules. 181 While

177. See generally, Center for Responsible Lending, et al., Comments to the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (Sept. 3, 2020) https://consumerfed.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/OCC-True-Lender-Comment_Sept3_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TY8U-PXSV] [hereinafter Center for Responsible Lending Comment
Letter] (providing a comprehensive discussion of the wide range of issues with the OCC’s
Madden-fix rules and mapping their potential impact(s) on consumers, small businesses, and
the lending market in general).
178. Even many of the observers who support the Madden-fix rules have noted areas and
questions that are still unanswered, such as an identical FDIC rule as well as related state
litigation which is mentioned in Part IV of this Note. See Eric T. Mitzenmacher et al., The
OCC Finalizes “Madden Fix” Regulation, Codifying the “Valid-when-Made” Doctrine as
Applicable to Loans Made by National Banks and Federal Savings Associations, CONSUMER
FIN. SERVICES REVIEW, (May 30, 2020) https://www.cfsreview.com/2020/05/the-occfinalizes-madden-fix-regulation-codifying-the-valid-when-made-doctrine-as-applicable-toloans-made-by-national-banks-and-federal-savings-associations/ [https://perma.cc/B3NNGBKM] (“The OCC’s rule is a positive development for those seeking regulatory certainty
for the secondary market in bank-originated loans and defending Madden claims.”)
179. See Cumming et al., supra note 43 (stating that the Madden-fix rules provided muchneeded clarity to the lending market.
180. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC Bulletin 2020–10,
THIRD-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS TO SUPPLEMENT OCC
BULLETIN 2013–29 (Mar. 5, 2020), at *1 (clarifying the OCC’s suggested approach for banks
operating in third party loan arrangement scenarios); see also, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULLETIN 2013–29, THIRD-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS: RISK
MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE (Oct. 30, 2013), at *1 (telling banks under the OCC how they should
work to limit their risk and ensure proper compliance with relevant lending laws).
181. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg.
68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (“However, there is often uncertainty
about how to determine which entity is making the loans and, therefore, the laws that apply
to these loans.”); see also Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or
Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7
and 160) (“Despite these authorities, recent developments have created legal uncertainty
about the ongoing permissibility of the interest term after a bank transfers a loan.”).
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arguable in their effectiveness, the positive intentions of the Madden-fix
are clear. 182
Primarily, these rules will likely provide clarity to the businesses
which were intended to benefit.183 The secondary lending market will be
able to return to their business models of acquiring loans from state and
national banks without worrying about the Saliha Maddens of the world
challenging the applicability of their loan’s interest rate. 184 Furthermore,
as intended, these rules will very likely help banks continue to offload
risky loans and debts to the aforementioned companies, thereby keeping
the companies in business and freeing up necessary capital for the
banks.185 From a consumer perspective, more free capital for banks
means a higher potential access to credit for borrowers. 186 For example,
several months of the COVID-19 pandemic saw historically low interest

182. See Cumming et al., supra note 43 (outlining the potential benefits of the OCC’s Valid
When Made doctrine Madden-fix, but discussing unanswered areas); see also David Clem,
OCC’s New “True Lender” Rule Already Having Positive Effects: Colorado Settles LongRunning
“True
Lender”
Case,
IRGLOBAL
(Oct.
5,
2020),
https://www.irglobal.com/article/occs-new-true-lender-rule-already-having-positive-effectscolorado-settles-long-running-true-lender-case/ [https://perma.cc/6YDE-UARP] (providing
one of the first examples of the OCC True Lender doctrine Madden-fix in use).
183. See Cumming et al., supra note 43 (“[T]he OCC’s final rule has the potential to
provide an additional arrow in the quiver for fintechs and others that purchase bank-made
loans.”)
184. Scott Stewart, Why Small Businesses Need Regulator’s Proposed “Madden-Fix,” AM.
BANKER (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/why-small-businessesneed-regulators-proposed-madden-fix [https://perma.cc/E26E-TYQV] (“Just like every
major corporation, small businesses need to have access to credit to hire more employees,
expand or simply maintain in times of hardship. Most entrepreneurs rely on the lending market
to grow.”).
185. See Cumming et al., supra note 43 (discussing some of the perceived benefits that the
Madden-fix rules will have for the secondary lending market).
186. There is some debate over the actual dollar-impact of how much increased capital
impacts consumer lending, but it is without a doubt that it has some positive impact(s). See
Press Release, Treasury Dept. (TG-95), Treasury Sec’y Timothy Geithner, Opening Remarks
as Prepared for Delivery to the Congressional Oversight Panel, (April 21, 2009) (stating that
a one-dollar capital injection generates between eight and twelve-dollars of lending capacity);
but see FED. RESERVE BD.-DIV’S OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS AND MONETARY AFFAIRS, THE
EFFECTS OF BANK CAPITAL ON LENDING: WHAT DO WE KNOW, AND WHAT DOES IT MEAN
(Aug. 17, 2010) (reviewing and concluding that the impact of capital for banks on increased
lending capacity may be different than what was previously thought).
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rates and an exponential growth in the housing market. 187 In these
situations, easier credit access can lead to rapid lending market growth. 188
However, the OCC failed to provide for any sort of a stop-gap
that would prevent predatory lenders from taking advantage of these
opportunities in the future.189 At the outset, it appears as though the OCC
sought to relegate Madden to nothing more than a blip on the otherwise
stable history of the Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines. 190 In
their pursuit of “clarity” and “stability,” one need not look much deeper
to realize the serious issues poised by the OCC’s Madden-fix rules.191
C.

Issues with the Madden-Fix (the Bad and the Ugly)

The major failure of the Madden-fix lies within its overbroad and
overinclusive nature.192 The OCC had an invaluable opportunity to
provide the clarity that many sought post-Madden,193 but it chose to issue
two rules that were underwhelming in form and created considerable

187. See Greg Rosalsky, Parts of America See Housing Boom During The COVID-19
Pandemic, NPR (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/11/911828398/parts-ofamerica-see-housing-boom-during-the-covid-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/YNX9-XE88]
(highlighting some of the areas of the U.S. that have seen a rise in housing demand even
during the COVID-19 pandemic and attempting to trace the causes).
188. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Comm’n, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, Risk Pricing,
and Alternative Information, FDIC (June 16, 2017), fdic.gov/analysis/cfr/bank-researchconference/annual-17th/papers/14-jagtiani.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FH4F-39BN]
at
7
(discussing how increased information on consumers allows Fintechs to provide easier access
to credit for business and consumers who might otherwise be limited in their access to
traditional bank lenders).
189. Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (“[The Maddenfix rules] will effectively allow[] subprime consumer lending that is not subject to any interest
rate regulation, including by unlicensed lenders.”)
190. See Mitzenmacher et al., supra note 178 (discussing the OCC’s response to Madden
and what the author believes is still left to be done and answered).
191. See Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (discussing
how the Madden-fix rules will potentially have seriously negative impacts on at-risk
consumers); see also 21 States Urge OCC to Withdraw Proposed Madden Fix, LAW 360 (Jan.
22, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1236552/21-states-urge-occ-to-withdrawproposed-madden-fix [https://perma.cc/XAQ8-XRK3] (highlighting an example of the legal
opposition to the OCC’s Madden-fix rules, including challenges based within the
Administrative Procedure Act).
192. See Prof. Arthur E. Wilmarth , Comment Letter in Opposition to the OCC’s “True
Lender
Rule,”
(Aug.
11,
2020)
at
*3–4,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3673421 [https://perma.cc/9VEM-JE9]
[hereinafter Wilmarth “True Lender” Comment Letter] (listing the practical issues and
implications that will likely arise from the two OCC rules).
193. See, e.g., Michael Cumming et al., supra note 43 (discussing how the OCC’s Maddenfix Valid When Made rule could help offer clarity to a market left in limbo post-Madden).
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potential for consumer harm in their function.194 Assuming that the OCC
truly saw Madden as an assault on these doctrines, it is strange that its
response would be to craft two rules which effectively undermine decades
of state usury laws.195
Even more curious is why the OCC would not engage in a joint
rulemaking with the FDIC in response to these questions. 196 Both
agencies cited the need for “clarity” yet published their own rules with
their own comments and responses.197 The similarity in both intent and
function of the NBA and Section 1831d might lead one to think that a
bank’s national versus state charter should not be a concern when
applying the Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines. 198 While the

194. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23 (“The proposed rule is contrary to the public interest
because it would allow national banks and federal savings associations to establish ‘rent-acharter’ schemes with payday lenders and other predatory nonbank lenders, thereby
encouraging abusive practices that would inflict very serious injuries on consumers and small
businesses.”)
195. NCLC Press Release, supra note 26 (“The OCC’s proposed rule would prevent courts
from examining the real nature of a predatory rent-a-bank scheme, help predatory lenders
conceal their schemes from judicial review, and turn state usury laws into the ‘dead letter’
that the Supreme Court predicted in 1835.”)
196. Federal Agencies are free to engage in joint rulemaking measures. While each
involved agency must propose and publish its own final rule(s), there is generally no limitation
on multiple agencies working in concert during the process. It is worth noting that in function,
both the OCC and FDIC’s Valid When Made rules are very similar. While the latter revised
the text of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”) text section 331.4(e) to align with the
OCC’s rule more closely, the two results are generally the same. However, unlike the OCC’s
rule, the FDIC’s Valid When Made rule explicitly states that it will unfavorably view entities
who partner with banks to evade state usury laws. The OCC has made no such statement in
as clear of terms. See NOTICE-AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED
STATES (2020) (outlining different methods of agency rulemaking, including joint
rulemaking).
197. Note that the FDIC has not issued a similar “True Lender” rule as of the writing of
this Note. In fact, the FDIC has openly questioned its authority to issue such a rule despite
calls for one. See Alan S. Kaplinsky, FDIC Questions Its Authority to Issue “True Lender”
Rule, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Dec. 9, 2020), https://consumerfinancemontior.com
[https://perma.cc/2CBE-NW6H] (stating that the FDIC, unlike the OCC, does not believe it
possesses the statutory authority to issue a True Lender rule, despite calls for it to do so).
198. The NBA and 12 U.S.C. § 1831d operate concurrently, with the former providing the
same choice of interest rate protections to nationally-chartered banks as the latter does for
state-chartered banks. Indeed, even the Second Circuit in Madden recognized that if a lender
was a non-bank entity, that it could not alone enjoy the choice of interest rate law(s) granted
by the NBA (and § 1831d). Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 247 (2d Cir.
2015) (“Because neither defendant is a national bank nor a subsidiary or agent of a national
bank . . . . we reverse the District Court’s holding that the NBA preempts Madden’s claims .
. . .”).
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absence of a joint rulemaking might seem peculiar, it also leads to the
potential that the rules could be overturned.199
Prior to Madden, state usury laws and a bank’s ability to choose
which one it would apply existed in relative harmony.200 However, one
of the most problematic themes from the Madden-fix rules is their lack
of qualifying instructions for states.201 Without any limits, these rules
have no way of preventing predatory lenders from gaining just as much
advantage as the legitimate businesses that the OCC intended to help. 202
A vague reference to a “robust oversight framework” is likely of little
comfort to the states and entities who now find their enforcement and
consumer protection powers stripped away by federal agencies. 203
Regarding the True Lender doctrine, the OCC recognized
variation in applications amongst courts.204 Still, the agency did not cite
a single instance where these varying applications led to a wrong
conclusion before Madden.205 Instead, the OCC pointed to a need for
clarity for lenders to know just what to expect when facing a court looking
into the nature of its loan.206 With that comes the initial question of why
the OCC found this rule necessary when it offered no instances of a
wrongfully applied inquiry prior to Madden.207 Did legitimate lenders
truly have that much to worry about with this inquiry? The OCC’s

199. While arguably unlikely, this Note recognizes the role that the Congressional Review
Act (“CRA”) could play in overturning either rule. As final rules, there is the potential that
the CRA’s backstop could allow for Congress to review these rules. See 5 U.S.C. § 8 (1996);
see also infra Part V.
200. See Baiamonte, supra note 138, at 127 (2019) (challenging the Valid When Made
doctrine but recognizing its role and existence).
201. See Kim & Rosenblum, supra note 162 (discussing the lawsuit by three states
Attorneys General on the OCC’s Madden-fix, including the claim that “[T]he OCC did not
give meaningful consideration to the rule’s facilitation of ‘rent-a-charter’ schemes by
predatory lenders.”).
202. Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (“[The Maddenfix rules] will effectively allow[] subprime consumer lending that is not subject to any interest
rate regulation, including by unlicensed lenders.”)
203. See NCLC Press Release, supra note 26 (claiming that states will be left powerless to
enforce their usury laws, should the Madden-fix rules be left as-is).
204. See generally National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed.
Reg. 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) and cases cited therein.
205. See id. (offering no explicit examples, beyond Madden, of a faulty application of the
True Lender inquiry).
206. Id. at 68,745 (“This approach will provide additional clarity and allow stakeholders,
including borrowers, to easily identify the bank that makes the loan.”).
207. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg.
44,224 (Proposed July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (offering examples of
varying applications and factors within the previous approach to the True Lender doctrine as
stated by the OCC in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the True Lender final rule).
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provided case law seems to indicate that they did not.208 Nevertheless,
the OCC opines about Madden, leading to a potential discouragement of
bank and third-party relationships and a “chill[ing] of innovation” had it
not answered the True Lender question.209
In a grander sense, these two rules work together to render state
usury laws null and void in the realm of stopping the Rent-A-Bank
scheme.210 Without qualification or limitation, predatory lenders have
practically been invited to come back into relevance with a new shield.211
Unlike past responses to rises in these predatory schemes, states will now
be left watching on the sidelines.212 States will now be powerless to look
any further than who originated the loan in form and whether that entity
was allowed to choose a certain state’s usury laws when deciding on an
interest rate.213
In evaluating this hapless approach to clarity within the secondary
lending market, one cannot help but think of a scene from the movie The
Naked Gun.214 As Detective Frank Drebin stands in front of an exploding
fireworks store, he tells onlookers to move along, saying, “there is
nothing to see here,” as chaos ensues behind him.215 In their response to
Madden, the OCC has assumed the role of Drebin, attempting to usher
the lending market along for better or worse, no questions asked.216 But

208. See id. (citing various factors and case law that the OCC claimed showed an
inexcusable variance in True Lender approaches which it sought to clarify).
209. Id. (“This uncertainty may discourage banks and third parties from entering into
relationships, limit competition, and chill the innovation that results from these [marketplace
lending] partnerships.”).
210. See, e.g., NCLC Press Release, supra note 26 (claiming that the Madden-fix rules strip
the states of their enforcement powers of usury laws and will leave consumers to suffer).
211. Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (“The rulemaking
green lights unregulated subprime lending nationwide.”).
212. For a thorough analysis of the varying roles of consumer protection laws in post-2008
and the major regulations that arose as a result, see Sean Ross, What Major Laws Were
Created for the Financial Sector Following the 2008 Crisis?, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/063015/what-are-major-laws-acts-regulatingfinancial-institutions-were-created-response-2008-financial.asp
[https://perma.cc/T99Q47VW] (discussing the various consumer protection laws following 2008 and spanning the
George Bush and Barack Obama Presidential Administrations).
213. Wilmarth “True Lender” Comment Letter, supra note 192, at 2 (“The proposed rule
would unlawfully override state ‘[T]rue [L]ender’ laws without congressional authorization
and in contravention of applicable court decisions.”).
214. THE NAKED GUN (Paramount Pictures 1988).
215. See id.
216. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23 (“The proposed [True Lender] rule unlawfully seeks to
override state ‘[T]rue [L]ender’ laws without congressional authorization and in
contravention of applicable court decisions. The proposed rule ignores the substance-overform analysis and the multifactor tests that have been applied in those decisions.”).
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unlike Drebin, the OCC must turn around and face the reality of the
darker potential of its current actions, either revising them or risking their
overturn.217
V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS
The Madden-fix needs fixing. The potential for limitless free
reign of predatory lenders partnering with nationally chartered banks to
extract exorbitant interest rates is a problem which should make the OCC
worried. There is no doubt that the lending market craves stability and
predictability.218 As a multitude of lawsuits and criticisms make clear,
the OCC is and will continue to be pressured to change these rules. 219 In
a preemptive attempt to explore what a clearer response to Madden might
entail, this Note presents three potential solutions to remedy the OCC’s
conundrum. The final option220 is offered as the preferred approach for
the OCC to truly provide clarity and stability while also precluding
predatory lending relationships.
Underlying all these solutions is the possibility that Congress may
utilize the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) to overturn the Maddenfix rules. The CRA provides a mandatory sixty day review period for all
agency rules.221 While unlikely, due to the highly divided makeup of the
116th and 117th Congresses,222 the significant changes and potential
217. As this Note posits, the two most likely ways that these rules would be overturned
would either be via that Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808) or under a new
Presidential Administration and a new Comptroller of the Currency. See 12 U.S.C. § 2; see
also infra Part V and Part V.A.
218. U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, Fin. Stability Oversight Council,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscalservice/fsoc [https://perma.cc/EZS3-JV7E] (“The Council is charged with identifying risks to
the financial stability of the United States; promoting market discipline; and responding to
emerging risks to the stability of the United States' financial system.”).
219. To review the two largest and most noteworthy lawsuits against the OCC and FDIC
for their Madden-fixes, see California v. OCC, No. 4:20-cv-05200 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2020);
see also California v. FDIC, No. 4:20-cv-05860 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2020).
220. See infra Part V.C.
221. See 5 U.S.C. § 801 (1996) (stating the mandatory 60-day review period for Congress
over Agency action(s)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (1996) (defining a “major” rule).
222. The CRA requires a joint Congressional resolution signifying disapproval, along with
either a signature from the President or an override of any veto. 5 U.S.C. § 801 (1996). The
116th Congress was comprised of mostly Democrats in the House and Republicans in the
Senate, making joint resolution unlikely. Membership of the 116th Congress: A Profile,
Cong. Res. Serv. at 1 (Dec. 17, 2020) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45583.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8MD4-P6SJ]. While the 117th Congress does feature a Democrat majority
in both the House and Senate, the Senate majority is courtesy of the tie-breaking vote of Vice
President Kamala Harris. Therefore, a joint resolution would still be unlikely due to the
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impacts of these rules might subject them to legislative review and even
overturn.223 The timing of their release and publications could very well
preclude the CRA from being an effective tool for addressing the
shortcomings of the Madden-fix rules.224 Additionally, any other typical
method of affecting legislative change would be cumbersome and
unlikely to succeed. 225
A.

Return to the Pre-Madden Days

The first solution is the most drastic. The OCC should consider
abandoning its Madden-fix rules and allow the market to return to its preMadden state. Embracing this solution would mean that one would have
to agree that Madden was in fact narrow in its applicability and that the
Valid When Made doctrine was set to remain effective. 226 Supporters of
this line of argument point to a variety of places to buttress this stance. 227
From viewing the NBA and Section 1831d’s choice of state usury rates
as more of an estoppel versus a preemption228 to stating that Madden was
potential for even a single vote by a Democrat in opposition to likely render any action null
and void. See Members of the 117th Congress, GOVPREDICT (Dec. 4, 2020),
https://www.govpredict.com/blog/the-members-of-the-117th-congress
[https://perma.cc/QC2Z-YHC8] (outlining the demographics and affiliations of the 117th
Congress and its members).
223. OIRA has determined that neither rules are “major rules” under 5 U.S.C. § 804(2).
Even still, Congress would have sixty session days from the rule’s publication in the Federal
Register to then file a joint resolution of opposition. 5 U.S.C. § 802.
224. The Valid When Made rule was promulgated by the OCC on June 2, 2020, which
would mean that the sixty days of the CRA would have ran by the writing of this Note.
However, the True Lender rule was promulgated on October 30, 2020, meaning that the sixty
session days have not yet run. Also note that both rules are to be published in the Federal
Register thirty days after their promulgation, further extending the likelihood that a new
Congress could review and overturn the True Lender rule.
225. Consumers are always able to lobby for greater protections at the state level. For
instance, a state that is generally friendly to higher interest rates such as Delaware or Nevada
might enact consumer protection legislation and introduce new usury laws. However, this
cumbersome process would leave many consumers exposed to predatory lending for
indefinite periods of time in states that are known for their history of high interest rates.
226. See Baiamonte, supra note 138, at 149–52 (arguing that non-bank loan purchasers
should not enjoy the NBA’s choice of state usury laws as it could lead to predatory lending
but concluding that the Valid When Made doctrine, while stable, is suspect in its own right).
227. See Lo, supra note 18, at 67–71 (critiquing Madden and arguing that its impact over
time will be limited); see also Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 2 ("Although Madden is having
an adverse short-term impact, we believe that ultimately it will be properly limited in its scope
and impact, will not be embraced across the board by other state or federal courts, and will
not result in significant changes to the law and principles of bank lending and usury.”).
228. See Levitin Predatory Lending, supra note 8 (“The National Bank Act does not render
a loan non-usurious. Instead, it preempts application of the usury law against the National
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simply wrong by ignoring the Valid When Made doctrine.229 The main
theme with this solution is the idea that the lending world did not actually
change much post-Madden. 230
This option would undoubtedly be the most contentious. Just as
there are those who believe that Madden had little impact on the lending
market, there are others who think it represented significant change. 231
As the OCC recognized in its recounting of why these rules were
necessary, there was variation amongst the states and courts in how they
approached the doctrines.232 In function, this solution would embrace
that variability which the OCC saw as so problematic.233 This could be
quite worrisome to industries whose entire business models depend on
their newly assumed loan’s interest rate being valid when it was made
along with wanting the originating bank to be the loan’s true lender.234
At its core, this solution would re-vest the states and courts with their
power to inquire into these specifics while returning to the assumption of
the Valid When Made doctrine’s legitimacy.
The reason why this solution may be less tenable resides in the
fact that it would meet strong opposition from those who celebrated the
Madden-fix, including the OCC.235 As the OCC assumed the role of
providing the clarity it believed the market needed, it will likely take
action from the new Biden administration and a new Comptroller of the

Bank. In other words, the loan is not valid when made, but attempts to raise a usury defense
are estopped as against a national bank.”).
229. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 2 (claiming that the Second Circuit in Madden
“misplaced” its focus and thus came to a holding that will be limited in its impact).
230. See id. (“[N]otwithstanding the Madden decision, the valid-when-made doctrine
should remain alive and well.”).
231. See Honigsberg, Jackson Jr. & Squire, supra note 59, at 36 (concluding that Madden
did have an impact on the lending practices and credit-availability for consumers within the
2d. Cir. Ct. of Appeals).
232. See generally National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed.
Reg. 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (claiming that the OCC’s True
Lender rule is “necessary” to help banks partner “confidently” with marketplace lenders and
insinuating that such confidence was not possible under the varied approaches used by states).
233. See id. at 68742 (claiming that there is often “uncertainty” amongst banks and
marketplace lenders who seek to determine the True Lender on a loan); see also Permissible
Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530
(June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (repeating that this Valid When
Made rule is intended to introduce “certainty” into the marketplace lending arrangements of
the present and future).
234. See supra Part II.B.
235. See Cumming et al., supra note 43 (showing an example of support for the Maddenfix rules).
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Currency236 to make this solution possible. Specifically, the Trump
administration repeatedly evinced a desire to promote deregulation
amongst federal agencies.237 Some have observed that the Madden-fix
rules are an extension of this goal.238 It is unlikely that the OCC would
reintroduce a new regulation, especially when considered alongside
President Trump’s executive directives.239 With the victory of Joseph
Biden in the 2020 presidential election,240 it is possible that the new
administration could reverse these rules by either implementing their own
or revoking them altogether. Should the CRA fail to affect these rules,
then this solution’s only real hope would reside with a new administration
or the courts.241
B.

Revise the Madden-Fix Rules to Preclude Predatory Lending

If the OCC is willing to consider the negative potential that its
Madden-fix could have, then a solution could be as simple as revisiting
the rules and providing actual clarity to its position on predatory lenders.
In such a scenario, the OCC would do well to consider a joint rulemaking

236. Comptroller of the Currency; Appointment, 12 U.S.C. § 2 (1935) (offering the
description of how one is appointed by the President to be Comptroller of the Currency).
237. See Keith Belton & John Graham, Deregulation Under Trump, CATO INST. at 14 (June
2020),
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2020-06/regulation-v43n2-5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2JU6-323U] (“Donald Trump seems determined to go down in history as a
deregulator.”).
238. See, e.g., Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (calling
the Madden-fix rules the “ultimate DC swamp move.”).
239. See Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (2017) (requiring agencies to identify
two rules for removal for every new rule created).
240. See Michael R. Blood & Nicholas Riccardi, Biden Officially Secures Enough Electors
to Become President, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 4, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/election2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-elections-electoral-college3e0b852c3cfadf853b08aecbfc3569fa [https://perma.cc/5474-2833] (stating that Joseph R.
Biden has secured enough electoral votes to become the 46th President of the United States).
241. Challenges to the Madden-fix in court will likely prove to move slowly and take a
long time. Indeed, the new rules are already being employed in cases such as one in Colorado.
See Clem, supra note 182. Additionally, some commentators have observed that the Maddenfix could still be overturned by the courts in what is known as the “Chevron-doctrine.” See
Pratin Vallabhaneni, et al., OCC Finalizes Madden-Fix Rule; New Acting Comptroller Lays
Out
Priorities,
WHITE
&
CASE
(June
5,
2020),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/occ-finalizes-madden-fix-rule-new-actingcomptroller-lays-out-priorities [https://perma.cc/AE64-2VLX] (“The [Madden-fix] rule does
not directly overturn Madden and, as a result, its significance may ultimately turn on how
much deference courts are willing to give to agency interpretation of federal law under the
Chevron doctrine.”); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Defense Council 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
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alongside the FDIC who is facing similar criticism with its rule.242 The
major issues with these rules relate to their broad umbrella of protection
to all types of lenders.243 Aside from those who flatly disagree with the
OCC’s perceived need for clarity post-Madden,244 it is hard to ignore the
benefits that these rules can have for legitimate businesses such as
Midland Funding, LLC and their debt-purchasing operations.245 This
solution suggests the OCC should embrace these positives while working
to eliminate the rule’s downsides.246
In its rulemaking process, the OCC recognized the various
approaches by states, especially with the True Lender doctrine.247 The
notice of proposed rulemaking itself even listed many of the factors
which courts across the country consider and the various identifiers for
which they might look.248 The perplexing quality about these rules is that
the OCC recognized and then proceeded to disregard this traditional
deference to state authorities, all for the sake of “clarity.”249
A possible alternative would be to incorporate these categories
and factors into the True Lender rule itself.250 There are several key
factors that practically all courts appear to use with some degree of
variability.251 These common factors in their simplest forms are: (1) the
substance of the agreement in light of the totality of the circumstances;
(2) the incentives of the involved parties to make or assume the loan; and
242. See, e.g., State of California v. FDIC, No. 4:20-cv-05860 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 20, 2020)
(showing a similar bout of opposition to the FDIC’s Madden-fix from many of the same
Attorneys General who oppose the OCC’s Madden-fix).
243. See, e.g., Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (arguing
that the OCC’s post-Madden rulemaking will give rise to predatory lending).
244. See, e.g., Levitin: Predatory Lending, supra note 8 (claiming that the Valid When
Made doctrine is based upon a “misreading” of case law and therefore is not what some
believe it to be).
245. See supra Part IV.B.
246. See supra Part IV.C.
247. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,742
(Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (tracing the variety of factors that were
common across the True Lender doctrine).
248. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg.
44,224 (proposed July 22, 2020) (offering caselaw examples of True Lender inquiries).
249. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,745
(Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (“This approach will provide additional
clarity . . . .”).
250. The OCC even recognizes a variety of factors and inquiries that underly the True
Lender doctrine. National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg.
44,224 (proposed July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (listing some of the most
common approaches to True Lender inquiries).
251. See id. (stating major examples of the True Lender inquiry in action in different states
and courts).
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(3) who holds the predominant economic interest in the loan.252
Regardless of the specific forms they take, these three elements
summarize the inquiries that even the OCC recognized as generally
used.253 By allowing the states some leeway in looking beyond the mere
form of the origination of the loan, the OCC can alleviate both the
federalism254 and practicality concerns255 of its Madden-fix. Virtually all
states rely on some version of the True Lender doctrine. 256 Thus, if the
OCC believes that clarity in the market is necessary then it should not do
so at the expense of a state’s ability to protect its consumers. 257
The other piece which this solution would entail is a narrowtailoring or creation of an exception on the OCC’s stance on the Valid
When Made doctrine. This change is envisioned as a complement to the
proposed True Lender changes.258 Here, the OCC could probably not rely
on a predefined prohibition on certain categories of lending, as predatory
lenders can easily shift their approaches.259 Instead, the OCC might
consider an addition to the rule which allows it to punish banks that are
found to be repeatedly engaged in selling loans to predatory lenders.
While many other consumer protection laws exist, 260 this added penalty
could preserve the Valid When Made doctrine for those marketplace
lenders who legitimately rely upon it and disincentivize those who seek
to take advantage of it.
252. See id. (dictating the factors which the OCC identified as common across the True
Lender doctrine).
253. See id.(showing that even the OCC recognized that there were typical True Lender
doctrine approache(s)/factors prior to and after Madden).
254. See California v. OCC, No. 4:20-cv-05200 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2020) (“This case is
about federal overreach.”).
255. See supra Part IV.
256. See Gilmer, supra note 16 (observing the utilization of the True Lender doctrine in
litigation across multiple states).
257. See Baiamonte, supra note 138, at 153 (concluding that “Allowing third-parties who
purchase bank notes to benefit from the NBA . . . preemption of state usury laws is legally
incorrect and harmful to consumers.”).
258. The OCC’s issuance of a follow-up rule to its Valid When Made decision highlights
how these two doctrines work in tandem. Because of this fact, any Madden solution must
consider both doctrines and their interplay. See National Banks and Federal Savings
Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
7); see also Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred,
85 Fed. Reg. 33,530-36 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160).
259. See Munger, supra note 122, at 468 (examining all the ways that predatory lenders
have shifted to usurp state laws and authorities).
260. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1950) (“The
Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or
corporations. . . from using unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices. . . .”).
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While offering the potential to disincentivize relationships with
predatory lenders, this solution would ultimately face a tough battle. As
it currently operates, the OCC does not occupy an enforcement role
against banks in the realm of secondary lending markets.261 Although
creating a system of punishment for banks that engage in such
arrangements may prevent or dissuade future actions by, giving the OCC
penal powers to levy upon them would be a drastic increase of their
abilities under the NBA.262 Furthermore, entities such as the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) currently operate within this
general role of consumer protection and penalization. 263 Creating a
system which allows the OCC similar powers would likely create
interagency tensions, as well as a potential for a violation of the nondelegation of adjudicatory or legislative powers depending on the form it
takes.264 While the OCC and FDIC warn of the “reputational” risks that
Rent-A-Charter or other predatory lending relationships can have for
banks,265 they should also recognize that the few banks that engage in
261. In the OCC’s own words, their role as an “independent branch of the U.S. Department
of the Treasury” involves chartering, regulating, and supervising all national banks. To
accomplish this, the OCC lists its various tasks, all of which involve monitoring of nationally
chartered banks. The closest apparent role to a penalization is in their ability to issue
“corrective orders,” a common practice amongst agencies. According to the OCC, these
“corrective orders” are reserved for “necessary” instances in which OCC-governed banks do
not comply with laws and regulations. Most the OCC’s daily tasks involve oversight and
advisement, not penalization. See About Us—What We Do, OCC (2020)
https://www.occ.treas.gov/ [https://perma.cc/3RVG-6DYW]. But see News Release 2020132, OCC Assesses $400 Million Civil Money Penalty Against Citibank, OCC (Oct. 7, 2020)
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2020/nr-occ-2020-132.html
[https://perma.cc/6XAU-6UQW] (offering an example of an OCC penalty for a bank violating
a law, in this case, regarding cybersecurity and data protection).
262. See Enforcement Actions, OCC (2020) https://occ.treas.gov/topics/laws-andregulations/enforcement-actions/index-enforcement-actions.html [https://perma.cc/FHE9ZM4U] (outlining the OCC’s enforcement tools and providing a search function to review its
past enforcement actions).
263. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5491
(2010) (establishing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and granting its scope of
enforcement and supervisory powers).
264. While non-delegation of adjudicatory powers is not here examined beyond conjecture,
the leading case for any such challenge is CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). Similarly, the
leading case for non-delegation of legislative powers is Whitman v. Am’ Trucking Ass’n, Inc.,
531 U.S. 457 (2001).
265. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg.
68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (“The OCC agrees that rent-a-charter
schemes have no place in the federal financial system . . . .”); see also Permissible Interest on
Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530-36 (June 2,
2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (“[The OCC] has consistently opposed
predatory lending, including through relationships between banks and third parties.”); see also
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such behavior choose to continue to do so in spite of these risks.266
Something more than an indeterminate warning is necessary to stop them.
This solution also falls short due to its inability to provide
consumers any relief from predatory lending relationships, something
which many of the pre-Madden approaches did.267 While it could
penalize banks and lenders, dissuading them from entering future
predatory lending relationships, this option offers nothing to help those
consumers currently stuck in them. Instead, the best approach would be
for the OCC to combine these two solutions to create a lending “safe
harbor”—offering accountability for banks while also returning methods
of redress into the hands of the consumer.
C.

The Preferred Solution—Creating a “Safe Harbor” for Banks to
Take Loan Accountability While Offering Consumers Redress
From Predatory Lenders

The two previous solutions have strong potential but come with
some glaring flaws. A return to the pre-Madden days is likely to be flatly
opposed by the OCC and those who celebrated the rules. 268 Similarly,
the enactment of a system of punishment for banks that engage with
predatory lenders may sound straightforward, but would actually be a
dramatic change from the OCC’s current enforcement model of
advisement over punishment.269 At the core of both of these solutions is
the fact that the Madden-fix rules are heavily skewed towards form over
function.270 To create a functional model that protects consumers and
offers them tools for redress against predatory lenders, the OCC should
See Federal Interest Rate Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,153 (July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 331) (discussing the FDIC responses to commentators who feared its rule would
facilitate predatory lending).
266. See Letter from the Ctr. for Responsible Lending et al., to Congress (Sept. 20, 2017)
https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crlsupport-protectingconsumers-unreasonablerates-sep2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G4USYFMN] (noting the very real and damaging actions of predatory lenders and partnerships with
banks and how they impact American consumers).
267. See Hannon, supra note 89, at 1273-74 (citing Cuomo v. Clearing House Assoc., 557
U.S. 519, 536 (2009) (discussing the Supreme Court’s approaches and interpretations of OCC
rules that sought to limit state consumer protection laws).
268. See, e.g., Cumming et al., supra note 43 (showing that there were commentators who
were pleased with the Madden-fix rules and celebrated their potential to bring certainty and
clarity to the lending market).
269. Enforcement Actions, supra note 262.
270. See Wilmarth “True Lender” Comment Letter, supra note 192 (arguing that the
Madden-fix True Lender rule will give too much of a shield to predatory lenders who would
seek to exploit it).
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consider returning the Valid When Made doctrine to its pre-Madden form
while attempting to codify the True Lender doctrine. 271
This solution operates in two parts. It (1) embraces the argument
that Madden did not question the Valid When Made doctrine;272 and (2)
agrees that the True Lender doctrine did, as the OCC stated, need
clarity.273 Together, these two understandings would allow the OCC to
offer predictability and certainty to the lenders and businesses it sought
to nurture while also giving consumers the protection they need.
The first consideration of this solution echoes the concerns that
many observers of the lending market post-Madden felt: the case itself
had very little impact on the lending market and practically no impact on
the Valid When Made doctrine. 274 Indeed, Madden never addressed or
mentioned the doctrine by name.275 The Second Circuit even appeared
to misinterpret the NBA’s choice of state usury laws as it failed to account
for the Valid When Made doctrine.276 By accepting the premise that
Madden was terminally flawed, and should be limited in its holding, the
OCC would allow the Valid When Made doctrine to return to its status
pre-Madden.277 However, legitimate marketplace lenders need not
worry. The operation of the NBA and Section 1831d’s interest rate
choice of law—along with the pre-Madden Valid When Made doctrine
and this proposed True Lender doctrine—would help identify and
eliminate predatory lending arrangements while preserving their
legitimate loan relationships.
271. While the current True Lender final rule did arguable codify the doctrine, this Note
argues that the current method focuses too much on form over function and that the OCC
should revise it accordingly. See supra Part IV.C.
272. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 22–23 (discussing the ways that lenders have
restructured their practices to retain the benefit Valid When Made doctrine in the Second
Circuit post-Madden).
273. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg.
68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (claiming that clarity in the lending
market and with marketplace lender arrangements was necessary and led to the promulgation
of the True Lender doctrine rule).
274. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 22–25 (outlining the potential changes to the
lending market post-Madden and stating that doctrines such as the Valid When Made, should
remain relatively unaffected).
275. See id. at 1 (noting that the Second Circuit apparently ignored the existence of the
Valid When Made doctrine).
276. See id. at 21 (noting that the Solicitor General and the OCC both petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari in Madden, with both pointing to the 2nd Circuit’s failure to
account for the Valid When Made doctrine).
277. See Franson, supra note 104, at 46–47 (noting the argument proffered by the U.S.
Solicitor General in the petition for certiorari post-Madden, in which it was claimed that the
Valid When Made doctrine was effectively already codified in the NBA and that the Madden
court undermined it).
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The second facet of this solution will require more creativity on
the part of the OCC. While the proposed rule about the True Lender
doctrine did arguably codify it, the current form leaves consumers
exposed and without protection.278 Instead, the OCC should seek to
create a much more functional system where banks may take some form
of accountability and risk for the loans that they originate. In short, the
OCC should create a “Safe Harbor” for banks in the form of a holding
period for loans that, if satisfied, would preclude a finding that another
entity is the true lender in a particular relationship.
A suggested concept could mimic the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) holding period for determining whether someone
is actually taking on an investment risk themselves or is simply acting as
an intermediary for the true purchaser. 279 This rule by the SEC dictates a
set period during which the holder of the security must take on the risk of
a private placement investment prior to divestment.280 The OCC could
easily create a similar system or risk-period in which banks assume the
risk of all of their loans much like the holder of an investment security
interest does with the SEC.281 In tandem with this holding period, states
could maintain their various approaches to inquiring into a loan’s true
lender.282
While transferring a loan before the holding period had been
completed would not automatically result in a lending relationship being
deemed “predatory,” it could be an indicator in the factors that courts
traditionally use to investigate.283 Furthermore, this safe harbor solution
would allow a loan that is held by a bank for the pre-determined amount
278. See Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (“The Trump
administration’s [OCC] proposal would allow payday lenders to make loans in every state
without regard to state usury laws (or state licensing requirements and thus enforcement of
other state consumer protection laws)…just as long as those lenders partner with a bank.”).
279. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1972) (showcasing the SEC’s holding period statute which
the OCC could seek to mimic).
280. See id. (outlining how the investment holding period operates with the SEC).
281. No specific timeframe or holding-window is suggested here. The goal of this option
is to create accountability for banks and the loans that they issue, not to tie up capital and
restrain their lending practices. See Hannon, supra note 89, at 1288 (2018) (“Quite intuitively,
the longer and more substantive the role of the bank in the rent-a-charter arrangement, the
more likely it is that the bank’s regulators will effectively detect and deter abusive or unsafe
practices and encourage or mandate conformance with fundamental principles of safety and
soundness and consumer protection.”).
282. For a thorough discussion on the history and development of the True Lender doctrine,
see John Hannon’s comprehensive overview, id. at 1280–84.
283. To see a discussion of the pre-Madden-fix True Lender doctrine in action, along with
some of the aforementioned factors subtly being applied, see Franson, supra note 104, at 1–3
(discussing True Lender litigation in Colorado in 2018 and showcasing how courts often look
beyond the mere fact of who funds the loan when determining its “true lender”).
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of time, to be protected from a finding of the bank not being the true
lender in the relationship.284 If a bank were to decline the set holding
period and still offload the loan to a predatory lender then consumers
would be protected by this backstop, allowing them an avenue of redress
for potential harms caused by any predatory relationships.285 In effect,
this system would act as a two-part filter, aimed at catching and
dissuading predatory lenders while also providing legitimate institutions
a predictable and uniform system.286 States could retain their varying
factors of consideration, with this being one potential indicator, and the
OCC could ensure more predictability.287
Instead of taking on a punitive role via the prior suggestion,288
this solution would allow the OCC to retain its observational and advisory
position.289 This would let courts and consumers have some methods of
relief from predatory lending relationships while also creating a
predictable system for banks and lenders. Contrasted with an approach
to the True Lender doctrine which refuses to look any deeper than who is

284. As some commentators have observed, the SEC’s holding period for certain securities
is being expanded to new markets such as blockchain and cryptocurrency. See What to Expect
in 2020, MANATT FINTECH (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/manattfintech-what-to-expect-in-2020-54942/ [https://perma.cc/5TKK-K6JY] (exploring the
process of the SEC securities holding period as applied to “tokens and other items of value.”).
Much as the SEC does for securities it determines to be held for noninvestment intent, the
OCC could easily replicate this practice for bank loans. See 12 C.F.R. § 34.82 (2019)
(showcasing an example of a holding period which the OCC already mandates for banks, here
concerning the holding of “Other Real Estate Owned” (OREO)).
285. See Munger, supra note 122, at 500 (providing another potential solution for
expanding consumer protection and enhancing state laws via three elements).
286. As one of its main reasons for its Madden-fix rules, the OCC cited “recent
developments” (i.e., Madden) as the need to provide clarity to lenders and the market.
However, much of the criticism of the Madden-fix rules claim that the OCC’s approach was
much too broad and left states powerless to enforce their usury laws. See National Banks and
Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7); see also Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or
Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530–36 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pts. 7 and 160); but see NCLC Press Release, supra note 26 (arguing that the OCC’s Maddenfix will strip state usury laws of their efficacy and power).
287. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23 (criticizing the OCC for stripping states of their
ability to examine suspect lending relationships via “multifactor tests”); see also National
Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,743 (Oct. 30, 2020),
(stating that the OCC believes that a “simple” test is necessary to create predictability with
the True Lender doctrine).
288. See supra Part V.B.
289. See About Us—What We Do, OCC (2020) https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/
[https://perma.cc/3RVG-6DYW] (noting that the OCC largely operates to supervise the banks
and institutions that fall within its purview).
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named on or originates the loan,290 this approach begins with a consistent
pattern of the bank holding and taking on the risk of its loans. This would
not only disincentivize banks from making risky loans but would also
make it harder for predatory lenders to utilize the quick offloading of
loans on which they typically rely.291 Unlike a reassurance that a “robust
system of oversight”292 will catch future predatory lending, this solution
would offer a tangible metric for banks, marketplace lenders, and
consumers to have some much needed certainty.
Together, this solution would be the strongest approach for the
OCC to consider. Allowing states and courts to regain some of their tools
of consumer protectionism while simultaneously creating a uniform and
predictable pattern within the lending market would achieve all the
OCC’s stated Madden-fix goals.293 Furthermore, the OCC cited the need
for consistency as its major basis for promulgating both rules.294 This
proposal offers that consistency while also allowing for a functional
method of rooting out predatory lenders.
VI. CONCLUSION
In responding to Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, the OCC
believed that it was providing much needed clarity to the lending
market.295 In crafting its Madden-fix, the OCC sought input and feedback
in its typical fashion, but the final products were underwhelming and nonresponsive to many of the concerns.296 The current Madden-fix rules lack
290. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg.
68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (claiming that a bank will be the
True Lender on a loan if it is either named on it or funds the loan).
291. See Hannon, supra note 89, at 1264–65 (outlining the normal process of a predatory
“Rent-A-Charter” lending relationship).
292. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg.
68,743 (Oct. 30, 2020) (“This test will provide legal certainty, and the OCC’s robust
supervisory framework effectively targets predatory lending, achieving the same goal as a
more complex [T]rue [L]ender test.”).
293. Supra Part IV.B.
294. National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,742
(Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7); see also Permissible Interest on Loans That
Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530–36 (June 2, 2020) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160).
295. See generally National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed.
Reg. 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7); see also Permissible Interest
on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530–36 (June
2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160).
296. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966) (offering the Administrative Procedure Act’s outline for
agencies engaging in rulemaking procedures); see also Wilmarth “True Lender” Comment
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sufficient guideposts to prevent predatory lending; instead, they seem to
invite it. While they do provide several benefits to legitimate marketplace
lenders, the risk of harm to consumers is much greater if the rules are left
as is. The OCC should strongly consider creating a system of
accountability for banks and their loans while also allowing their interest
rates to remain valid when transferred to legitimate secondary lenders.
Without such changes, consumers will be at an increased risk of
becoming victims of predatory lending, the likes of which have been
curtailed for well over a decade. 297
JORDAN A. KOONTS*

Letter, supra note 192, at 19 (showing many claims as to why the OCC Madden-fix is
problematic and potentially impermissible).
297. See Gilmer, supra note 16 (mapping the rise in prevalence and efficacy of True Lender
litigation in protecting consumers).
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